Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS by Barker, John C.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1993
Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the
Problem of SLAPPS
John C. Barker
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 395 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol26/iss2/13
COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
TO THE PROBLEM OF SLAPPS
John C. Barker*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 396
II. IDENTIFYING SLAPPs .................................. 399
A. The Public Interest Element ......................... 400
B. The Causes of Action Used .......................... 402
C. SLAPP Plaintiffs' Motives ........................... 403
III. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES FOR SLAPPs ............... 407
A. Specific Pleading .................................... 407
B. Discovery Costs ..................................... 408
C. Acceleration of Preemptive Judicial Review ........... 408
D. Dismissal Standards ................................ 409
1. Threshold standards ............................. 409
2. Factual review standards ........................ 412
E. Government Intervention in the SLAPP .............. 413
IV. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: DEFENSES .................... 414
A. Precautions Before a SLAPP Is Brought .............. 414
B. Frivolous Lawsuit Remedies and Ethical Duties ....... 416
1. Duties under professional ethical codes ........... 416
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 .............. 417
3. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5. 419
C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage ............................... 420
D. Defamation and Opinion ............................ 421
E. The Right to Petition the Government; Petitioning
Privileges; and the Noerr/Pennington Doctrine ....... 425
1. The right and its importance .................... 425
2. The Noerr/Pennington sham exception to the
petitioning privilege ............................. 428
* Associate at Adams, Duque & Hazeltine; B.A., 1978, Williams College; J.D., 1992,
Hastings College of the Law. An earlier version of this Article was prepared for the Public
Law Research Institute, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, in response to
questions from members of the California Legislature. The California Lockyer bill on SLAPPs
was subsequently enacted on September 16, 1992.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
3. California's Section 47(b) privilege ............... 429
V. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: SLAPP-BACKS ............... 431
A. Abuse of Process .................................... 433
B. Malicious Prosecution ............................... 434
C. Other Possible SLAPP-Back Theories ................. 438
VI. DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS... 439
A. Damages ........................................... 440
1. Compensatory tort damages ..................... 440
2. Emotional distress damages ...................... 441
3. Restitutionary recovery ....... ................... 442
4. Punitive damages ............................... 443
5. Statutory combinations of damage measure ....... 444
B. Attorney's Fees ...................................... 445
1. The American rule .............................. 445
2. Statutory fee awards ............................ 445
3. Common-law exceptions ......................... 446
4. Statutory exceptions ............................. 446
VII. STATUTORY REMEDIES .................................. 448
VIII. COMBINING REMEDIES TO CREATE THE BEST ANTI-
SLAPP STATUTE FOR CALIFORNIA ...................... 451
IX. CONCLUSION ........................................... 453
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or "SLAPPs,"' are
meritless suits aimed at silencing a plaintiff's opponents, or at least at
diverting their resources. To illustrate, a classic scenario pits a real estate
developer against a neighborhood group opposed to a particular develop-
ment. The local group distributes a negative flyer, publishes a hostile
editorial in a local paper or protests to some government body. Group
members might speak out at town meetings, for example, or pursue a
more sophisticated strategy of reporting environmental violations to the
state agency or the Environmental Protection Agency. The developer
then responds with a SLAPP for defamation or interference with pro-
spective business advantage. By definition, SLAPPs are meritless.
2 If
the hypothetical editorial damaged the plaintiff developer's reputation by
1. George W. Pring, SL4PPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. RPv. 3, 4 (1989).
2. See id. at 8.
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falsely accusing the plaintiff of criminal activity and was published by the
defendant local group with actual malice,3 this would not be a SLAPP.
The plaintiff developer in this scenario brings the SLAPP to silence
opponents and to discourage others from opposing the proposed develop-
ment. In addition, the SLAPP is used to tie up an opponent's finances,
time and efforts until the project is approved or public outcry subsides.
Such suits are a subset of harassment, or "strike" suits, in that SLAPPs
are filed not for their merits but to intimidate defendants.
SLAPPs have an additional political dimension, however, that dis-
tinguishes them from other harassment suits. Citizen participation in
self-government is at stake, implicating the constitutional right to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances.' One objective of a
SLAPP is depoliticization: the removal of the controversy from the un-
tamed, fickle political/legislative arena to the manageable judicial arena
where rights are limited and enumerated.
As apparent from these initial portrayals, SLAPPs pit two sets of
fundamental constitutional rights against each other: (1) defendants'
rights of free speech and petition and (2) plaintiffs' rights of access to the
3. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328, 349 (1974).
4. Sharlene A. McEvoy, "The Big Chill'" Business Use of the Tort of Defamation To
Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503, 505
(1990) (noting that such cases have been dubbed "nuisance suits"); Ron Galperin, Getting
SLAPPed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, at K1, KI (quoting Penelope Canan's characterization
of such suits as "'bogus lawsuits' "). But see Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPPI
SLAPPback:- The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L.
& POL. 417, 424 n.14 (1991) (stating that nuisance suits may not be solely to harass and are
therefore different from SLAPPs).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; see United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (stating that right to petition is "among the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights").
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:395
judicial system6 and rights to non-falsely maligned reputations.7 Solu-
tions to the SLAPP problem must not compromise any of these rights.
Plaintiffs must be able to bring suits with reasonable merit and defend-
ants must be protected from entirely frivolous intimidation suits designed
to chill legitimate participation in public affairs.
Part II of this Article more fully defines a SLAPP, specifically ex-
amining a plaintiff's motives for bringing such a lawsuit. Many existing
defenses to SLAPPs and all the proposed solutions depend on threshold
identification of a suit as a SLAPP; if it is not a SLAPP, an anti-SLAPP
statute cannot be invoked.
The rest of the Article examines both partial and comprehensive so-
lutions. Part III considers procedural measures, such as more specific
pleading or acceleration of summary judgment. Part IV concentrates on
substantive defenses to SLAPPs. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the
Supreme Court nominally eliminated any "constitutional privilege for
'opinion'" in defamation cases,8 but left collateral doctrines, such as the
non-actionability of "rhetorical hyperbole," intact.9 In the right to peti-
tion context, the Noerr/Pennington doctrine defines the perimeters of le-
gitimate petitioning. 10
6. The Due Process Clauses protect both plaintiffs' and defendants' rights to access the
courts. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982). The "right to petition
the government for redress of grievances necessarily includes the right of access to the courts."
Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Colo. 1984) (citing
Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)); Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage
Condominium Ass'n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). As discussed in detail
infra in part IV.E, the constitutional right to petition is not absolute, and the petitioning activ-
ity will not be privileged if its sole purpose is improper harassment or sham. McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1985) (citing Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
741 (1983); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972));
Protect Our Mountain Env't, 677 P.2d at 1367-69; Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 39-40 (W. Va.
1981).
Freedom of association may also protect specific activities during litigation, such as solic-
iting membership and dues for an organization formed to litigate. Great W. Cities, Inc. v.
Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827, 834-35 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing
United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)); Mis-
souri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289, 304-06 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aft'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
7. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707-08 (1990) (balancing
"guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues" against society's "'pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation'" (quoting Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966))).
8. Id. at 2707.
9. See kL at 2706-07; infra part IV.D and accompanying text.
10. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see infra part IV.E.
SOLUTIONS TO SLAPPS
Part V discusses existing counteractions, or "SLAPP-backs."
Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are the most prominent
SLAPP-backs; although without the crucial modifications discussed,
they are not necessarily the most effective way to deter SLAPPs. As a
prelude to statutory solutions, part VI summarizes common-law ap-
proaches to awards of damages, costs and attorney's fees, in SLAPPs and
SLAPP-backs.
Part VII surveys various state statutory approaches. Most state
statutes and proposed bills have some provision for a defendant to re-
cover costs and fees from a SLAPP. After that similarity, however, the
statutes and bills diverge widely, from New Jersey's comprehensive bill
protecting petitioners of government as well as defendants speaking out
on public matters, to New York's narrow defamation-reform bill. Cali-
fornia's recently enacted Lockyer bill'1 does not follow other designs in
allowing state intervention on the side of SLAPP defendants. Nor does it
require specific pleading or allow damages awards, other than litigation
costs and fees, to either defendants or plaintiffs. The Lockyer bill supple-
ments existing legal protections by providing for very early judicial
screening of potential SLAPPs that implicate First Amendment rights of
speech and petitioning, and by allowing fee awards to SLAPP defend-
ants. This Article suggests that these two features are necessary but not
sufficient components of California anti-SLAPP legislation. Ultimately,
part VII summarizes various state statutes and bills and their shortcom-
ings in light of the goal of actually deterring SLAPPs. Because most
large SLAPP plaintiffs would not be dissuaded from pursuing their
SLAPPs by the prospect of paying the defense's fees, this Article con-
cludes that states should look further for fair and effective solutions to
the SLAPP problem. Part VIII recommends several components of a
comprehensive anti-SLAPP bill that would be fair to plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike.
II. IDENTIFYING SLAPPs
SLAPPs are by definition meritless suits. 2 Plaintiffs intend not to
win but "to intimidate and harass political critics into silence."' 3 The
11. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 726, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3029 (West) (to be codified at
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 425.15, 425.16 and CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 5047.5, 24001.5).
12. See Pring, supra note 1, at 8.
13. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 423; see also Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of
Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, 6 ("SLAPPs are lawsuits that can
chill, intimidate or otherwise harass people into silence by making it prohibitively expensive
for them to pursue First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition government.").
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classic SLAPP depicted in the introduction14 pits a small citizen group
against a big developer, but these relative sizes are not universal.15 Pub-
lic plaintiffs in SLAPP suits are common. 16 Private SLAPP plaintiffs are
usually private developers or landlords. 7
Estimates of the magnitude of the SLAPP problem vary widely"
and naturally depend in part on the definition chosen. Integral to any
proposed anti-SLAPP solution is a definition of a SLAPP that is neither
too broad nor too narrow. An overly broad definition would unfairly
impede legitimate plaintiffs from their rightful access to the legal system,
while an overly narrow definition might allow too many SLAPPs to be
brought.
A. The Public Interest Element
Perhaps the most controversial definitional element of SLAPPs is
the "public interest" element. Some commentators' definitions limit
SLAPPs to suits involving matters "of public interest or concern." 1 9
Similarly, the recently enacted Lockyer bill covers only suits involving
First Amendment activity "in connection with a public issue."20
14. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
15. Defendants can be well-financed organizations, such as the Sierra Club. See, e.g., Si-
erra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Paula Goedert, The SLAPP Suit Threat:
Squelching Public Debate, 22 AM. LIBR. 1003 (1991); George W. Pring, "SLAPPs": Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation: A New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma,
C534 ALI-ABA 937, June 25, 1990, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
16. Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An
Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REv. 399, 402 n.20 (1991) (citing Penelope Canan &
George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantita-
tive and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 385, 389 (1988)). Public plaintiffs
have included state and local governments, id., public-employee organizations, Boyle, supra
note 13, at 9, and "schoolteachers and city council members," Galperin, supra note 4, at K1.
Note that the recently enacted Lockyer bill exempts "any enforcement action brought [for
Californians] by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public
prosecutor." Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(d)).
17. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 402; Boyle, supra note 13, at 6. SLAPPs are "filed in
nearly equal percentages by developers, public officials and citizens." Susan Kelleher, Speak-
ing Out Could Lead to Liability, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 26, 1990, at N3, available in DIA-
LOG, File No. 716 (citing Penelope Canan, The SLAPPfrom a Sociological Perspective, 7
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 23 (1989)).
18. Philip Hager, Tide Turns for Targets of SLAPP Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at
A3, A31 (noting that Penelope Canan and George W. Pring have found that 400 SLAPP suits
have been filed nationwide since 1984, 14% of which originated in California): Slapping back
at SLAPP suits, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 9, 1991, at B6 (editorial). Dan Walters estimates the
figure to be "more than 1000 legal actions." Dan Walters, First Amendment Under Assault,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 8, 1991, at A3.
19. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401.
20. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
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Aside from being vague, the public interest element creates two
practical problems for SLAPP defendants. First, it creates a question of
fact: whether the petitioning concerned a matter of public interest. Be-
cause a main goal of SLAPP opponents is to eliminate litigation or re-
duce the time of trial, adding extra issues on which to litigate could be
counterproductive. 2'
Second, the public interest element is problematic primarily because
SLAPP defendants are almost always motivated by some self-interest.2"
If this fact alone is enough to disqualify a lawsuit from SLAPP-specific
solutions, a loophole is created for SLAPP plaintiffs. For example, the
homeowner H, adjacent to a lot that the SLAPP plaintiff-developer in-
tends to develop, opposes that project not simply because it will be bad
for H's neighborhood or town, but because it will also be bad for H's
narrower individual interests of preserving H's property value, view and
lack of noise and traffic. This should not preclude H from obtaining
SLAPP-prevention remedies, or make H's petitioning activity illegiti-
mate. Solutions for SLAPPs "must focus solely on the SLAPP plaintiff's
motive in suing, not the defendant's objective in petitioning." 3
Vagueness of the terms "in the public interest" or "of public con-
cern" could also, of course, work in a SLAPP defendant's favor. Follow-
ing the spirit of the First Amendment right to petition,24 the hypothetical
homeowner H could argue that H's activities are in the public interest
even if entirely selfishly motivated.25 Circumventing the definitional
limit by expanding the public interest element in this way effectively
eliminates this element entirely-that is, it creates a tautology. One
could argue that any petitioning activity is per se in the public interest
because it enhances the democratic process and encourages responsive
21. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 400-01.
22. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Webb v. Fury,
282 S.E.2d 28, 40 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that proof of malicious intent or even knowing falsity
does not defeat right to petition).
23. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401; see also Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 44 (Neely, J., dissenting)
(discussing right to petition unless petitioning activities are mere sham).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961) ('The right of the people to inform their representatives
in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot prop-
erly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so.").
25. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401, interprets Pring's analysis, supra note 15, narrowly
and perhaps unfairly. Considering Pring's list of subject areas and his inclusion of Bell v.
Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985), Pring does not intend to eliminate self-interested advo-
cates from his definition of SLAPP defendants.
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government.2 6 In sum, if the public interest element is included in a stat-
utory or other definition of a SLAPP, it is crucial that this element be
broadly construed to allow for a SLAPP defendant's inevitable self-
interest.
B. The Causes of Action Used
SLAPPs are difficult to identify because they are brought as ordi-
nary tort actions.27 Thus, they are hard to quantify statistically. Also,
because SLAPPs "masquerade as ordinary lawsuits," courts have a diffi-
cult time recognizing them.28
Defamation is the most popular SLAPP cause of action.29 Many
SLAPP claims are brought for business torts, such as interference with
prospective business advantage or malicious interference with contract
rights.3" Conspiracy3' is often added in order to "make all defendants
joint tortfeasors."32 In California and New York, conspiracy is not a
separate substantive tort but rather a theory to connect other tortious
actions into a common pattern.33 SLAPPs have included an assortment
of other causes of action, such as nuisance and intentional infliction of
26. This is supported by the prime importance placed on the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances. See infra part IV.E. 1 for a discussion of the importance of this
right.
27. See Goedert, supra note 15, at 1003; Pring, supra note 1, at 7 n.6; Cosentino, supra
note 16, at 401.
28. Pring, supra note 1, at 9.
29. Id.; see also Joseph Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Ap-
proach, 28 SANTA CLmAA L. REV. 105, 113 (1988) (stating that libel and slander are included
among usual causes of action); Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401 n.15 (stating that defamation
is one of six most frequently observed claims); Hager, supra note 18, at A31 (stating that
defamation, interference with business and conspiracy are typical charges). But see David
Sive, Environmental Litigation Countersuits and Delay, C427 ALI-ABA 1319, June 26, 1989,
available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database (stating that malicious prosecution is most fre-
quently invoked tort, but noting that environmental countersuits assert defamation).
30. See Great W. ;Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 775
(7th Cir. 1979); Brecher, supra note 29, at 113; MeEvoy, supra note 4, at 504; Sive, supra note
29, at *2; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401; Galperin, supra note 4, at Kl; Hager, supra note
18, at A31.
31. Brecher, supra note 29, at 113; Pring, supra note 1, at 9; Boyle, supra note 13, at 6
(citing Maple Properties v. Harris, 470 U.S. 1074 (1985)); Hager, supra note 18, at A31.
32. Brecher, supra note 29, at 131.
33. See SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 744 (App.
Div. 1987); Brecher, supra note 29, at 131 (citing Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 454,
629 P.2d 1369, 1376, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 164, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981)).
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emotional distress.3a Several of these causes of action, particularly abuse
of process and malicious prosecution, are also used in SLAPP-backs.35
C. SLAPP Plaintiffs' Motives
By definition, SLAPP plaintiffs have improper motives.36 SLAPPs
are consequently difficult to spot without further factual analysis, thus
complicating early identification. A SLAPP plaintiff's primary motive is
to chill a defendant's speech or protest activity and to discourage opposi-
tion by others.37 Although most SLAPPs are unsuccessful at trial,38
some succeed in chilling the defendants' activities prior to trial by forcing
them to back down. 39 The large damage amounts sought in SLAPPs,
averaging $9.1 million," are staggering to unsophisticated, inexperienced
parties. In addition, plaintiffs often go after defendants' houses or farms,
which can lower property values and discourage activity by other neigh-
bors.41 Two of Professor Canan's four listed motivations for filing
34. Causes of action for which SLAPPs have been brought include: antitrust, Missouri v.
NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 449
U.S. 842 (1980); nuisance, Pring, supra note 1, at 9; malicious prosecution, Brecher, supra note
29, at 113; Sive, supra note 29, at *2; Galperin, supra note 4, at KI; emotional distress, id.;
abuse of process, Brecher, supra note 29, at 113; McEvoy, supra note 4, at 504; Pring, supra
note 1, at 9; Sive, supra note 29, at *2; civil rights violations, McEvoy, supra note 4, at 504-05;
constitutional rights violations, Pring, supra note 1, at 9; prima facie tort, SRWAssocs., 517
N.Y.S.2d at 744; Sive, supra note 29, at *2; and invasion of privacy, Goedert, supra note 15, at
1003.
35. See infra part V.
36. See Pring, supra note 1, at 3-9.
37. See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 34 (W. Va. 1981); McEvoy, supra note 4, at 505-06;
Kelleher, supra note 17 (quoting Eve Pell, director of First Amendment Project at the Center
for Investigative Reporting in San Francisco, who stated that "'having a lawsuit filed against
you is like having a monster move in with your family' ").
38. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
39. Pring, supra note 1, at 8; see also Boyle, supra note 13, at 6 (describing case of condo-
minium developer Joseph Cioccolanti); Galperin, supra note 4, at K15 (describing Westlake
North Property Association's suit against Lang Ranch and City of Thousand Oaks); Mary B.
Regan, When Water Protests Grow Loud, Lawsuits Say Shut Up, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
18, 1991, at BI (describing Florida ease in which Save Our Neighborhood dropped suit to
avoid litigation costs).
40. Galperin, supra note 4, at K1; Hager, supra note 18, at A31. SLAPP suit amounts can
get much larger. See, ag., Boyle, supra note 13, at 6 (noting $64 million SLAPP by condomin-
ium developer Joseph Cioccolanti against defendant Jim Baker in New York); Putting a Stop to
Unfair Suits, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1991, at A16 (editorial) (noting $63 million SLAPP by
Beverly Hills condominium developer Maple Properties against League of Women Voters'
letter-writing campaign).
41. See Hager, supra note 18, at A3 (" 'They were going after all we had-our farms and
our homes."' (quoting Jeff Thompson who was defendant in SLAPP suit brought by J.G.
Boswell Company)); see also Sive, supra note 29, at *3 (noting that filing of lis pendens on
defendant's house was held not to be abuse of process under California and Alaska law in City
of Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)); Galperin, supra note 4, at KI (noting that
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SLAPPs concern their chilling effect: "The attempt to prevent expected
future, competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues; [and]
the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that opposition
will be punished."'4
SLAPPs dissuade not only named defendants, but also their neigh-
bors and their community.13 Commentator Joseph Brecher expresses
concern about "a serious diminution in the critical watchdog role played
by citizens and citizens' groups."'  Plaintiffs often name Doe defendants
in their SLAPPs, so that anyone who steps forward after filing can con-
veniently be added. 5 Some SLAPP defendants may be worried not only
about financial exposure, but also about stigma in their community.46
defendant group protesting airport noise "can expect a tough time selling or refinancing [their
houses] until the airport authority drops its claim").
42. Penelope Canan, The SLAPPfrom a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv.
23, 30 (1989).
43. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 466-70; Pring, supra note 1, at 6; Cosentino, supra
note 16, at 405. See also David Conn, Bill Would Help Activists Fight Nuisance Suits, BALT.
MORN. SUN, Jan. 29, 1992, at IC, in which SLAPP defendant Ruth Ann Snyder stated: "At-
tendance at [Bowie, Maryland's] zoning hearings dropped to about 50 from more than 200
before the SLAPP was filed." Id.
44. Brecher, supra note 29, at 105. Brecher describes recent procedural encouragements
of citizen involvement, such as relaxation of standing requirements, id. at 106-10; see also
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973) (standing conferred to student group suing for environmental harm based on "attenu-
ated line of causation"); statutory allowances for citizens' groups, elimination of irreparable
injury requirement for injunctions involving environmental statutory violations; easier inter-
vention for public interest groups, Brecher, supra note 29, at 105-10 (describing Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983)); and citizen access laws such as the
Freedom of Information Act, id, at 110. Assembled against these advantages for citizens are
the obvious systemic and financial advantages of developers and other typical SLAPP plain-
tiffs. Brecher expresses concern that the pendulum win be drawn back by the latter's powerful
magnet. Id. at 110-13.
45. Boyle, supra note 13, at 7 (describing case of condominium developer Joseph Ciocco-
lanti); see also Putting a Stop to Unfair Suits, supra note 40, at A16 (describing case with 500
Doe defendants).
Costantini and Nash describe how plaintiff Boswell's representative phoned non-parties
who had contributed only small amounts to a fund to publish the ad at issue in the SLAPP.
See Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 454-55. Fred Starr was among those called. Id. at
467. Costantini and Nash note that:
Fred Starr's apology and guarantee to cease supporting the [defendant] Family
Farmers' efforts were sufficient to forestall [his] being served as one of the John Does
in the libel complaint. He testified that merely being named a codefendant by [plain-
tiff] Boswell would have jeopardized his ability to secure the bank loans he needed to
farm his crops ....
Id.
46. Boyle quotes SLAPP defendant Catherine Cream "'I've done nothing libelous, scan-
dalous or anything I should be ashamed of. I'm just an ordinary citizen; I go to work every
day. I worry about paying bills. I'm no Cesar Chavez. I'm just Josephine Average. By filing
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SLAPP plaintiffs' primary practical motivations are delay, expense
and distraction. "'The typical SLAPP ties its victims up in court for an
average of three years.' " Although defendants may ultimately prevail,
they may be unable to recoup their litigation costs or attorney's fees.48
Even if defendants win back their fees, they must pay them up front or
risk loss because of default.4 9 Naturally, expenditure of significant
amounts of money raises the ante for SLAPP defendants unaccustomed
to such outlays.5 0 Strategically, SLAPPs divert defendants: 1 During a
SLAPP's pendency, the defendant's resources are tied up; a defendant
organization may lose members; and while preparing for litigation, a
small group or an individual will have no time to protest.
Plaintiffs' third primary motivation is depoliticization. The SLAPP
moves the controversy away from the public or legislative arenas into the
private judicial arena. 2 Arguably courts are relatively isolated from the
political process.5 3 More importantly, resolution of problems in court,
except for occasional innovative equitable decrees, is a win-lose process
in which only one party can win. In contrast, in a legislative setting,
conflict resolution is accomplished by compromise and balancing com-
peting interests. Conflicts crucial to community development may be
best resolved in a legislative setting.54 As far as impact, in the political
arena a small or poorly funded group can conceivably stir up significant
SLAPP suits, people with the wherewithal can stifle small groups.'" Boyle, supra note 13, at
9.
47. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 404 n.36 (quoting Penelope Canan, The SLAPPfrom a
Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 23, 26 (1989)); see also Galperin, supra note
4, at Ki, K15 ("[T]he average SLAPP asks for $9 million in damages and lasts about three
years before getting resolved."); Mark Goldowitz, SLAPP Lawsuits and the First Amendment,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 23, 1991, at B13; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6
("lilt takes an average of three years and thousands of dollars in legal fees to settle those
meritless cases."); cf Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426-28 (noting that Boswell SLAPP
defendants ultimately won $13 million for libel, but it took eight years, including appeals).
48. Under the American rule, parties must each pay their own costs and fees unless a
common-law or statutory exception exists. See, eg., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1021-1021.9
(West 1980 & Supp. 1992); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263-
69 (1975). Part VI infra will discuss such California common-law exceptions as the Serrano v.
Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), private-attorney-general the-
ory and the Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985),
tort damages theory. Part VII infra will discuss existing and proposed statutory theories of
recovery.
49. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 525; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18.
50. Brecher, supra note 29, at 114; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 404.
51. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.
52. Canan, supra note 42, at 23-24; McEvoy, supra note 4, at 506; Pring, supra note 15, at
*937; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.
53. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.
54. See id. at 428.
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grass-roots interest, but a court outcome is more dependent on the par-
ties' financial backing and skill. Traditionally, courts eschew the polit-
ical aspects of controversies and political lines of analysis."5 Legal issues
are often arcane to the lay public. A judicial setting also "transforms the
focus of the dispute, '5 6 by switching attention from the plaintiff's ac-
tions, in the press or local political body, to the defendant's actions, in
court. Similarly, SLAPP litigation "transform[s] the dispute topics (for
example, zoning becomes libel) and move[s] the forum."57
Professor Pring notes that as the third step in a cyclical process,
SLAPP defendants can re-politicize the dispute by using a Petition
Clause defense5" and by bringing their cause to the press or to the gov-
ernment. Allowing government intervention in a SLAPP would accom-
plish half of this third step by involving a public body, even though the
dispute is still in a judicial forum.5 9 Finally, another motivation identi-
fied by Professor Canan is to use SLAPPs "as simply another tool in a
strategy to win a political and/or economic battle."'6
SLAPP plaintiffs may have other motives.6' Most crucially, SLAPP
plaintiffs do not intend to win the litigation. "[P]revailing in the courts is
not the goal of the plaintiffs. Rather, they seek to silence their critics by
forcing them to spend thousands of dollars to defend themselves." 62 In
fact, defendants win eighty to ninety percent of all SLAPP suits litigated
on the merits. 63 Specifically because winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff's
prime motivation, existing safeguards are inadequate. They focus on
preventing plaintiffs from winning meritless suits. SLAPP plaintiffs,
55. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that challenge to Tennessee ap-
portionment statutes does not present nonjusticiable "political question"); see infra note 370
and accompanying text.
56. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.
57. Pring, supra note 15, at *24.
58. Id.; see infra part IV.E.
59. Government intervention is discussed infra in part III.E.
60. Canan, supra note 42, at 30.
61. For example, Professor Canan lists retaliation as another motive. Id. Certainly,
SLAPPs can have devastating effects on their defendants. For example, SLAPP defendant
Barbara Dolan and her husband "'were faced with financial ruin. It took two years to fight
this case, two years of personal agony .... My mother was already in fragile health, and it's
my belief the stress of the experience hastened her death. So even if the other side loses, there's
been cost to you."' Thomas Clavin, The High Price of High Ideals, WOMAN'S DAY, Sept. 24,
1991, at 51 (quoting Barbara Dolan).
62. Walters, supra note 18, at A3; see McEvoy, supra note 4, at 505-06; Cosentino, supra
note 16, at 403.
63. Pring, supra note 15, at *23; Clavin, supra note 61, at 50; Slapping back at SLAPP
suits, supra note 18; see also Brecher, supra note 29, at 113-14 (stating that no SLAPP plaintiff
has won SLAPP suit); Hager, supra note 18, at A31 (stating that 80% of SLAPPs are either
dropped or won by defendant).
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however, expect to lose their suits, and often concede the litigation costs,
such as the defendants' attorney's fees, as costs of doing business."
Thus, a Petition Clause defense or the specter of a malicious prosecution
SLAPP-back will not necessarily deter the original SLAPP, which by
that time may have accomplished the delay or diversion necessary for the
plaintiff's project to be approved or even completed.
III. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES FOR SLAPPs
Legislators, commentators and courts have proposed an assortment
of procedural antidotes to SLAPPs. Some proposals, such as court-
ordered discovery costs and specific pleading, are minor and clearly sup-
plemental to larger remedies.65 Others, such as significantly accelerating
initial court review on the merits, would serve as more formidable deter-
rents to filing SLAPPs. Any of these procedural fixes could be accom-
plished either by statute or by the rules of the court. Many are included
in existing or proposed legislation, as discussed below.
A. Specific Pleading
Judge Neely's dissent in Webb v. Fury66 suggested a mandate that
pleadings be more specific if First Amendment rights are involved.67 The
current default in notice-pleading jurisdictions is to require "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief,"' 68 but disfavored actions such as fraud require specific pleading.
69
Greater pleading detail will facilitate the initial judicial triage that is es-
sential to dismiss SLAPPs early. Its value would arise in conjunction
64. See Galperin, supra note 4, at K15 (stating that developers who file suits do not expect
to win).
65. Commentators Costantini and Nash include removal as a possible alternative strategy
to a direct SLAPP-back, for SLAPP defendants to quickly terminate litigation. Costantini &
Nash, supra note 4, at 477 n.230. The strategic value of removal would of course depend on
the jurisdiction and the political biases of the respective state and federal courts therein. Con-
ceivably, it could help either side. In addition, California and federal courts may have different
standards for the petitioning privilege. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. Obvi-
ously, removal would not eliminate the suit, its chilling power, or its cost and delay.
66. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
67. Id. at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting). "'The danger that the mere pendency of the action
will chill the exercise of first amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would
otherwise be required.'... If necessary, the Court should invoke its rule-making authority and
amend the Rules [of Civil Procedure] to so provide." Id. (Neely, J., dissenting) (quoting
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)); see also
Cosentino, supra note 16, at 423-24 (discussing Judge Neely's dissent in Webb).
68. E.g., FED. R. Cv. P. 8(a)(2).
69. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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with other procedural remedies outlined below, such as the acceleration
of a heightened dismissal standard.
B. Discovery Costs
Discovery is usually the most expensive, time-consuming and intim-
idating litigation stage before adjudication on the merits. In addition to
the harassment of the SLAPP itself, the liberal discovery allowed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides opportunities for further har-
assment.70 Judge Neely's dissent in Webb recommended that courts be
allowed to order a plaintiff to pay for all of a defendant's discovery costs
up front "in appropriate circumstances of gross imbalance of assets";
then, if the plaintiff wins at trial, the defendant would reimburse the
plaintiff for those advance discovery costs. 71 Mandatory payment of a
defendant's discovery costs, like specific pleading, is a supplemental rem-
edy, effective only in conjunction with more potent SLAPP-deterring
measures.
California's recently enacted Lockyer bill provides SLAPP defend-
ants with "a special motion to strike" that defendants can exercise within
sixty days of filing a SLAPP.72 "All discovery proceedings in the action
shall be stayed" as soon as such a motion is filed and until the court
renders its decision on this motion.73 This provision effectively removes
much of the intimidation associated with voluminous discovery requests
by SLAPP plaintiffs.
C. Acceleration of Preemptive Judicial Review
Quick and early resolution of litigation is the single most important
component of any court or statutory scheme to prevent SLAPPs. Expe-
diting the SLAPP process will not only alleviate its chilling effect on de-
fendants, but it will also create disincentives for plaintiffs seeking
primarily to delay and distract their opponents. The earlier that thresh-
old judicial review occurs, the less effective the SLAPP will be. The Col-
orado Supreme Court, in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v.
District Court, essentially moved summary judgment review back to the
dismissal stage of the litigation.74
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Cosentino, supra note 16, at 408 n.54.
71. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting).
72. Act of Sept. 16, 1992.
73. Id § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g)).
74. 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984). Professor Canan asserts that "the average SLAPP
suit lasts 36 months, but the motion [to dismiss based on constitutional protection] reduces the
time to 4 months." Clavin, supra note 61, at 50.
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California's recently enacted Lockyer bill establishes even earlier ju-
dicial review.7" A complaint involving First Amendment rights and a
"public issue"76 cannot be filed-or if filed, is subject to an immediate
motion to strike-before the court has tested its validity, using affidavits
from both sides to ascertain whether the plaintiff has "a probability" of
prevailing on the merits. 77 The provision for input from both sides con-
tributes to the fairness of this proposed remedy. Its immediacy would
serve as a strong deterrent to SLAPPs because early dismissal before the
defendant has spent much time and money would significantly neutralize
a SLAPP's effectiveness. Of course the efficacy of such an accelerated
dismissal is contingent upon the dismissal standard used-in this case, on
exactly what "a probability" means.
D. Dismissal Standards
1. Threshold standards
Courts usually do not dismiss SLAPPs at the demurrer stage of liti-
gation because the claims generally present some cognizable claim.78
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff's claim may be
dismissed at this point only if" 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.' 179
Despite this formidable standard, some courts have dismissed
SLAPPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted."80 In Sierra Club v.
75. Act of Sept. 16, 1992.
76. See supra part II.A for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the public
interest component.
77. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
78. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 414; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing motion to
dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
79. Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268,
1273 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)), aff'd mem., 595
F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979); accord Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp.
934, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6). Massachusetts follows the federal
standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Bell v. Mazza, 474 N.E.2d
1111, 1115 (Mass. 1985). Similarly, in New York a defendant must show "'conclusively that
[the] plaintiff has no cause of action.'.. . [And] that, in light of the evidence presented, 'no
significant dispute exists."' SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d
741,743 (App. Div. 1987) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). Colorado courts will
dismiss "if recovery would be constitutionally prohibited, and.., such infirmity appears on
the face of the complaint." Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass'n, 670
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Butz,81 the defendant timber company alleged in its counterclaim that
the plaintiff environmental group "willfully" caused the government to
reject the defendant's timber sales. The federal district court dismissed
this counterclaim on three grounds: (1) The willfulness of the plaintiff's
petitioning activity by itself could not remove constitutional protection;
(2) the plaintiff's petitioning would have had to have been entirely for an
improper purpose under the Noerr/Pennington sham exception doctrine,
and this plaintiff had simply petitioned through the proper channels; and
(3) the plaintiff could not be held liable for the government's action even
if the plaintiff helped persuade the government to act.82
In Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n,83
the court dismissed the plaintiff's Sherman Act claim because the case
involved a political zoning fight, rather than the requisite commercial
dispute. 4 The court also dismissed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 because the plaintiff had not adequately specified what due pro-
cess rights, if any, had been denied.85 In addition, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 because, inter
alia, the court found no class-based discrimination.86
In SR WAssociates v. Bellport Beach Property Owners,87 a New York
court summarily dismissed a SLAPP for failure to state a claim. The
court rejected an injurious falsehood claim, finding no causation as a
matter of law; no prima facie tort claim because the defendant's intent
was not solely malicious; and no conspiracy claim because conspiracy
was not a valid separate cause of action.
88
As the Lockyer bill's probability standard is as yet untested, one can
only speculate what it will mean in practice. One commentator analo-
gized it to a threshold test used in medical malpractice for punitive dam-
81. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In this case the plaintiff and defendant are re-
versed so that the SLAPP is the defendant's counterclaim.
82. Id. at 939. See infra part IV.E for a discussion of the Noerr/Pennington sham
doctrine.
83. 443 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 843 (1979).
84. Id. at 1272-73.
85. Id. at 1272.
86. Id. at 1273.
87. 517 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. Div. 1987).
88. Id. at 743-44. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33 for a discussion of conspiracy
claims.
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ages. 9 The frivolous lawsuit sanction rules, Federal Rule 1190 and
California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, 9' do not provide help-
ful analogies for the probability standard, because these rules are usually
charitably applied.92 The criminal law's probable cause standard93 or the
civil standard for summary judgment, a "genuine issue as to any material
fact,"94 might be more helpful.
The Lockyer bill's original language included a "substantial
probability" standard. This language was the prime stumbling block for
opponents of the anti-SLAPP statute such as the California Building In-
dustry Association (CBIA).9" CBIA viewed a substantial probability as
a preponderance 96 presumably because "probable" literally means more
likely than not. Requiring a plaintiff to meet a preponderance burden
before discovery would no doubt impair the plaintiff's rights to due pro-
89. Goldowitz, supra note 47, at B13. Commenting on the "substantial probability" stan-
dard originally proposed in the Lockyer bill, Goldowitz stated:
[Tihe same test must now be passed in order to pursue punitive damages against
doctors, and an even more stringent test exists for punitive damage claims against
religious organizations. It makes sense to provide similar extra protections for citi-
zens willing to participate in our political process, particularly in these days of dwin-
dling public participation.
Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.13(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("substantial probability"
hurdle for medical malpractice punitive damages), 425.14 (West Supp. 1992) ("evidence which
substantiates" test for punitive damages against religious organizations); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1714.10(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("reasonable probability" screen for damages for certain
lawyer-client conspiracies).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
91. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
92. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538-42
(9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting broad application of Rule 11); Brecher, supra note 29, at 136 (noting
that California Supreme Court strictly construes sanction power). See infra part IV.B for a
discussion of frivolous lawsuit rules.
93. To prove probable cause to search or arrest, police authorities must show a magistrate
trustworthy facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the search or arrest is
necessary. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (holding that anonymous letter
whose facts police subsequently corroborated was sufficient to find probable cause). Signifi-
cantly, only a probability is required, not a prima facie showing of a crime. Id. at 235.
Although the probable cause requirement has been significantly weakened by many exceptions,
see, eg., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985),
the principle may still elucidate the substantial probability standard, especially as both phrases
share the elusive "probable" variable. The Gates case illustrates just how low the probable
cause threshold is: A pivotal fact on which the court relied to find that the police had probable
cause was that the suspect was going to Florida, a major drug-smuggling center. Gates, 462
U.S. at 243.
94. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
95. Telephone Interview with Richard J. Lyons, Lobbyist, CBIA (May 2, 1992).
96. Id.
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cess.97 Judging from the heavily litigated concept of probable cause,
however, substantial probability was not intended to mandate a prepon-
derance burden at such an early stage.
An earlier version of this Article, submitted to the State Legislature,
suggested a "substantial possibility" standard, which would placate busi-
ness interestsyet still provide an effective barrier to SLAPPs. The Gov-
ernor's Office of Planning and Research proposed a third wording for the
standard of threshold review: A court could look for "evidence to sub-
stantiate the claim."98 As discussed, a SLAPP is couched as an ordinary
tort claim, and invariably some evidence supports such a claim. For ex-
ample, the courts would find some evidence to support a claim where a
defendant did make a derogatory statement about a plaintiff, even if the
statement was clearly "rhetorical hyperbole." 99 The mere-evidence test
would therefore be too porous. In contrast, the "substantial possibility"
standard presents a workable compromise. It retains substantiality as a
minimal screen, but does not demand probability of success, just
possibility.
The language of the recently enacted Lockyer bill arrives at a differ-
ent compromise standard. The word "substantial" has been deleted, but
the word "probability" remains."°° Although retention of the word
"probability" seems to carry with it the same problematic connotation of
preponderance, this middle ground was apparently acceptable to business
groups and to Governor Wilson, who approved the bill with the
probability standard on September 16, 1992.101
2. Factual review standards
For initial review of SLAPPs to be effective, courts should also use
the summary judgment standard for factual deference, rather than the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard. At the dismissal stage, courts accept all allega-
tions of the complaint as true.10 2 At summary judgment, however,
courts view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.10 3 Court review of suits initially believed to be SLAPPs
97. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the constitutional right of access to the judicial
system. Constitutionally, the preponderance burden should not come into play until trial.
98. Letter from Richard Sybert, Director, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, to
Senator Bill Lockyer (April 28, 1992) (on file with author).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 167-81 for a discussion of rhetorical hyperbole.
100. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
101. See Act of Sept. .16, 1992.
102. E.g., United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1276 (1991).
103. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076-77
(1991).
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will necessarily entail some close factual analysis, as SLAPP claims are
almost always legally coherent.
California courts prefer to decide First Amendment-related cases at
summary judgment: "[B]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation
would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights,
speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. Therefore,
summary judgment is a favored remedy... ." l This has been particu-
larly true with cases involving the opinion privilege.105
E. Government Intervention in the SLAPP
Proposed anti-SLAPP bills in New Jersey and Maryland, and a re-
cent state statute in Washington, all provide for government intervention
on behalf of SLAPP defendants.10 6 The government body must be one to
which the SLAPP defendant initially petitioned. 107 If the government
body originally involved-prior to the SLAPP-does not choose to in-
tervene, then and only then, may the attorney general intervene on the
defendant's side.108 The subject matter of the original communication to
the agency must have been something "reasonably of concern" to that
agency. 109
Although only allowing government intervention on a defendant's
side may seem inequitable, and may even raise potential equal protection
issues, the Washington statute and the Maryland bill offset this effect by
allowing a SLAPP plaintiff to recover fees if the defense is unsuccess-
ful.110 Washington's more complex fee structure actually provides an ad-
104. Good Gov't Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 685, 586 P.2d 572, 578,
150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264 (1978) (citation omitted), cert denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
105. See, eg., Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781,
783 (9th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260, 268-69, 721
P.2d 87, 90, 96, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209, 215 (1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Okun
v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 450, 459, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 1379, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157,
162, 167, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981). However, if the language at issue is clearly am-
biguous and could be either fact or opinion, a jury should make the determination. Good Gov't
Group, 22 Cal. 3d at 682, 586 P.2d at 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520 (West Supp. 1992); S. 51, 398th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 1992); A. 190, 205th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1992). See Conn, supra note 43, for a discus-
sion of the Maryland bill. Government in this context means any federal, state or local gov-
ernment body or agency. The New Jersey bill also covers "any other political subdivision or
public body in the State." A. 190, supra.
107. 1di; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520. The government body or agency must have
"receiv[ed] a complaint or information under [§] 4.24.510 .... " Id
108. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520; S. 51, supra note 106; A. 190, supra note 106.
109. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.510; S. 51, supra note 106; A. 190, supra note 106.
110. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520; S. 51, supra note 106.
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ditional disincentive for agency intervention, by allowing a plaintiff to
recover fees and costs from the agency if the agency's defense fails."1
Allowing government intervention on behalf of SLAPP defendants
could significantly reduce both the chilling effect and the prohibitive ex-
pense to these defendants. In addition, because of the government in-
volvement, the dispute would not be entirely depoliticized, even though
the dispute was moved to a judicial forum. Government involvement in
general-not necessarily government intervention into the litigation as a
party-may also assist SLAPP defendants by interrupting the chain of
but-for causation. 12 On the other hand, SLAPP plaintiffs' aims of delay
and distraction would be largely unaffected by government intervention,
so this antidote is also supplemental. In other words, having the govern-
ment on their side may reduce both the chill and the expense of defend-
ing a SLAPP, but the SLAPP will still subject its defendants to delay and
distraction.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: DEFENSES
A. Precautions Before a SLAPP Is Brought
Though easier said than done, the best defense to the chill of a
SLAPP is to be informed rather than intimidated. A SLAPP defendant's
perseverance may well be rewarded, in that the eventual payoffs for a
malicious prosecution SLAPP-back can be substantial. 13 In addition,
political involvement at a local level can ensure that local planning bod-
ies are more responsive to citizens' interests. 4
More specific precautionary measures include avoiding defamation,
incorporating and obtaining insurance. Potential SLAPP defendants
speaking out or expressing themselves in writing against a powerful de-
111. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520.
112. E.g., SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743-44
(App. Div. 1987). In SR WAssociates, the court found that the defendant's allegedly false
statements to the public did not directly cause the town board's denial of the plaintiff devel-
oper's building application. Id. Because the board knew independently that the plaintiff ap-
plied to build single-family residences even though the defendant mischaracterized the
proposed buildings as "clustered," there could be no but-for causation for the plaintiff's injuri-
ous falsehood claim against the defendant. Id.; see also Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934,
939 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ("Lliability can never be imposed-upon a party for damage caused by
governmental action he induced." (emphasis added)).
113. For example, three farmers eventually won a multi-million dollar judgment against an
agribusiness giant, J.G. Boswell Corporation. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 11; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18. By the time of this judg-
ment, however, these farmers and many of their neighbors had long since withdrawn from any
further political activism. See Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 468-70.
114. See McEvoy, supra note 4, at 531.
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veloper or other public figure,"' would be well advised to avoid ad
hominem attacks and follow one columnist's advice: "Don't get personal
in your accusations .... [A]void insults or inflammatory charges." '116
This admonishment carries some chill, but could also encourage more
rigorous preliminary factual investigation by citizen activist groups. Citi-
zens' groups also can incorporate in order to keep SLAPP plaintiffs from
threatening their homes and personal savings. 117 Once incorporated, a
group can procure corporate liability insurance. Insurance coverage is
an obvious, although not always reliable, protection for SLAPP defend-
ants. Some homeowners' insurance policies cover legal costs."' SLAPP
defendants have discovered, however, that insurance coverage may de-
crease or disappear once a SLAPP is filed. I
Insurance reform would be another statutory approach to protecting
SLAPP defendants. 120 The state could either establish an insurance sup-
plement fund for SLAPP defendants, or require that insurance carriers
offer coverage or that carriers not reduce existing coverage.1 21 A state
115. An otherwise private individual who voluntarily inserts himself or herself into the
community on one particular project or matter can be considered a "public figure" as to that
project for purposes of defamation. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974);
Walters v. Linhof, 559 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Colo. 1983); Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.
3d 442, 451, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162, cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981).
For a discussion of the significance of public figure status, see infra notes 191-94 and accompa-
nying text.
116. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 531; Clavin, sup-a note 61, at 50.
117. Sive, supra note 29, at *2; Galperin, supra note 4, at K15. Professor Sive notes that a
corporate veil can be pierced if incorporation is fraudulent or accomplished solely to avoid
operation of law. Sive, supra note 29, at *1 n.3.
118. Clavin, supra note 61, at 50.
119. E.g., Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. FOl1230, slip op. at 10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. June
14, 1991). In J.G. Boswell, once the SLAPP was filed, the defendant farmers lost some insur-
ance coverage and were forced to obtain insurance from another company at greater cost. 1id;
Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 465. "Indeed, [defendant's] new insurance company ad-
vised him to avoid involvement in political campaigns if he wished to reduce the deductible he
had been required to take for personal damage insurance following the libel suit." Id. at 468;
see also Regan, supra note 39, at BI (quoting researcher's findings that SLAPPs led to cancel-
lation of insurance).
120. This Article discusses only broad options in the insurance reform area; further exami-
nation is beyond its scope.
121. Such a requirement may interfere with carriers' freedom to contract by telling them
with whom to do business. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Making a regulation, however,
that applies only prospectively could circumvent Contracts Clause challenges. JOHN E. No-
WAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 11.8, at 405 (4th ed. 1991). In
addition, the analysis in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242-44 (1978),
indicates that the Supreme Court would probably find that the Constitution permits such regu-
lation of insurance coverage despite the regulation's impairment of existing insurance con-
tracts, because the speech rights involved in SLAPPs are a "basic societal interest." See id. at
242. Insurance carriers could argue that they detrimentally relied on the absence of such
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insurance fund could be financed by collecting mandatory contributions
from unsuccessful defamation plaintiffs or SLAPP plaintiffs.' 22 Such in-
surance reform proposals would require a narrow threshold test to iden-
tify that insureds were indeed victims of SLAPPs. For example, the
statute could require an initial showing that free speech or the right to
petition was involved, or a showing that the defendant could not get ade-
quate coverage otherwise.
B. Frivolous Lawsuit Remedies and Ethical Duties
The existing provisions in professional ethical codes and sanction
provisions in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and California Code of
Civil Procedure section 128.5, do not adequately deter SLAPPs. These
provisions provide standards and enforcement proceedings that are lax
and are not SLAPP-specific.
1. Duties under professional ethical codes
Under both the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the
two American Bar Association codes, a lawyer cannot file a suit solely or
merely to harass or to delay.' 23 Thus, the lawyer must have probable
cause to bring the suit, and the suit must have some substantial purpose
other than harassment or delay. If the suit is short on law, the lawyer's
ethical duties are satisfied if the attorney has a good-faith argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.'24 Under the
ABA Model Code and Model Rules, the lawyer need not subjectively
believe that the argument will ultimately prevail, but must believe that
the argument is made in good faith. 2 Under the California Rules and
the Model Code, the merely-to-harass standard is applicable only if the
lawyer knows or should know that the suit is meritless.126 Duties under
mandates, in setting loss-reserve amounts, but the industry is so heavily regulated that this
reliance would be arguably misplaced. See id. at 250.
122. It appears that this particular proposal comes closer than many anti-SLAPP remedies
to directly penalizing plaintiffs for using the legal system to bring meritless suits.
123. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-200(A) (1989); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1990).
124. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-200(B); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.1.
125. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4; MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. The California Rules do not address this issue.
126. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-200(A); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1); cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.1 (omitting requirement of lawyer's knowledge).
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the ethical codes are unlikely to effectively prevent SLAPPs, because citi-
zen defendants are usually unaware of professional disciplinary options,
because the bar and the bench are reluctant to report their colleagues'
misdeeds,127 and because SLAPPs are couched as legitimate torts and are
not easy to recognize as meritless.
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 will not in practice or in princi-
ple prevent plaintiffs from filing SLAPPs for some of the same reasons
that the ethical codes will not, such as lax standards and enforcement.
Under Rule 11, a court can sanction a lawyer, client or both for bringing
a lawsuit for "any improper purpose," or for filing a lawsuit whose facts
as pleaded have not been reasonably investigated or are not based on
"existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."12 If, using an objective standard, either the
improper purpose or the good-faith basis in law or fact prongs are vio-
lated, then sanctions are mandatory. 129 The nature and severity of the
sanctions are up to the court, 3 ' but in practice they are hardly sufficient
to deter SLAPPs.13'
Superficially, SLAPPs will always appear to be well-grounded in
fact and law. SLAPPs will have no trouble passing the factual-basis
aspect of a Rule 11 analysis because SLAPPs, although improper, invari-
ably rest on some demonstrable facts or alleged statement by the defend-
127. The California Business and Professions Code has no general policing rule. The
American Bar Association codes both require lawyers to report their colleagues' ethical viola-
tions to the appropriate professional authorities, unless their knowledge of those violations is
privileged. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) & (c). Predictably, reporting under these two latter
national provisions is infrequent. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 419. Cosentino recommends
that SLAPP-reform schemes expressly require judges to report attorneys who bring SLAPPs
to state disciplinary bodies. Id at 427.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The lawyer filing the lawsuit must sign any "pleading, motion or
other paper." This signature certifies
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry [the lawsuit] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id.
129. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986).
Sanctions may be imposed either on a party's motion or on the court's own motion even after
the case has been dismissed. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990).
130. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., 886 F.2d 1485, 1496 (7th Cir. 1989).
131. For example, the sanction at issue in the Golden Eagle Distributing cases against a
large Chicago-based law firm was in the amount of $3,155.50. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d
at 1534.
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ants. The "not well-grounded in fact" standard will only prevent a
lawsuit without factual support, such as an antitrust action against a
non-competitor 32 or an action in which the lawyers have been especially
careless in reviewing the factual basis of the claim.133
Courts also can impose sanctions if a claim has neither a legal basis
nor a reasonable argument for a change in the law.134  As the Golden
Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. litigation demonstrates,
courts apply this aspect of Rule 11 very leniently. 35 In the predecessor
action, 136 the sanctioned law firm cited a 1965 California Supreme Court
case to support the unavailability of tort damages for economic loss
under California law, 13 but failed to cite the landmark 1979 California
Supreme Court case that allowed such damages if foreseeable. 138 The
trial court sanctioned the law firm for violating its "duty to disclose ad-
verse authority."'139 The Ninth Circuit reversed, contending that a law-
yer's role is to advocate, not "to find all potentially contrary
authority."1" Thus, the standard applied by the Ninth Circuit will not
132. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
133. E.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 388-90 (sanctioning lawyers for insufficient prefiling
investigation of claim for "nationwide conspiracy to fix prices" where lawyers merely tele-
phoned several men's stores in only four East Coast cities and inferred price fixing). In addi-
tion to determining that a pleading is well-grounded in fact and law, a court should "consider
all the circumstances," such as time pressures on the lawyer. Id. at 401.
134. Id. at 392; Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1534-39. Professor Sive observes that
Rule 1 I's language regarding "'the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law' " espe-
cially fits a developing area such as environmental law. Sive, supra note 29, at *5.
135. 809 F.2d 584, 586-89 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte
request for en banc hearing).
136. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
137. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
138. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
139. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1535; see also Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at 586
(Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing) ("How can a
brief be warranted by existing law if its argument goes in the face of 'directly contrary' author-
ity from the highest court of the jurisdiction whose law is being argued?").
140. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1542. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the trial
court's Rule 11 sanction for the law firm's misleading characterization of a United States
Supreme Court exception. Id. at 1534-35, 1541. It found the district court's "argument iden-
tification" requirement made too fine a distinction between whether an argument is based on
existing law or is an argument for an extension or modification of existing law. Id. at 1540.
This hair-splitting would lead to increased costs and complexity in litigation, which is at cross
purposes with the "key objective" of Rule 11. Id. at 1540-41. However, five circuit judges
expressed their strong disagreement, stating the firm should have made clear that the interpre-
tation it was advocating was not established law. See Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at 586
(Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing). Other circuits
concur with this dissenting opinion and have held that if a jurisdiction clearly disfavors a
particular lawyer's argument, then that lawyer must so state and argue for an extension or
modification of law. See, e., DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (11th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 952 (1990).
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encompass SLAPPs because SLAPPs are couched as standard tort ac-
tions and will always be well rooted in existing law.
A court can levy Rule 11 sanctions if a lawsuit is filed specifically to
harass or to delay. 141 The problem with SLA.PPs is not their lack of
arguable claims arising from arguable facts, but the impropriety of the
SLAPP plaintiffs' motives. A SLAPP's legal basis invariably will be a
standard tort principle; thus, the improper purpose component of Rule
11 is the only one applicable. One commentator argues that "unneces-
sary delay" can currently be sanctioned under Rule 11 and that any
further, SLAPP-specific, judicial rule in this area would not be
responsible. 142
A growing minority trend among federal circuit courts calls for a
link between enforcement of Rule 11 and lawyers' social responsibility-
for reassessing lawyers' ethical obligations as divided between their cli-
ents and the public. 43 Under this approach, arguing a minority position
or a position from dicta without identifying it as such, or failing to men-
tion an unfavorable landmark decision-such as J'Aire Corp. v. Greg-
ory-would itself constitute filing a suit "for any improper purpose."'"
The Ninth Circuit, however, does not follow this position, 145 nor would
the Supreme Court.'46 And the standard of review for the imposition of
sanctions by a trial court is abuse of discretion. 47 Because Rule 11 sanc-
tions are leniently imposed, leniently reviewed, and do not yield a high
enough fine to deter SLAPPs, Rule 11 will not prevent SLAPPs.
3. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5
California's version of Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure Section
128.5,148 offers a plaintiff a more generous standard than the federal
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1537; see also Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that new Rule 11 is intended to
prevent misuse of "judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic harassment").
142. See Sive, supra note 29, at *5-6. Sive also finds Rule II especially appropriate in the
context of environmental SLAPPs, in which issues are usually of both law and fact rather than
pure fact, so that Rule I l's emphasis on the lawyer's conduct rather than the client's is appro-
priate. Id. at *5.
143. See, e.g., DeSisto College, Inc., 888 F.2d at 755; Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at
586-89 (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing).
144. See, e.g., DeSisto College, 888 F.2d at 755; Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at 586-89
(Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing).
145. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1539-42.
146. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (applying reasonable-
ness standard to determine whether suit was fied for improper purpose).
147. Id.
148. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
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rule.149 A lawsuit must be frivolous to justify sanctions under section
128.5.150 As with Rule 11, the sanction amounts awarded are small, so
the deterrent effect is negligible. 51
In sum, although one commentator lists lawyer disciplinary sanc-
tions as an integral component of a reform program, 15 2 it appears that
sanctions alone will not prevent SLAPPs. Neither the ethical codes nor
the frivolous lawsuit rules are rigorously enforced. Sanction amounts,
when awarded, are too small to deter. It is easy for the lawyer to argue
that he or she was unaware of the underlying improper purpose, or under
the ethical codes, that the improper purpose was not the only purpose.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although courts have the power
to award sanctions against clients, Rule 11 and section 128.5 may be
more an incentive for a client to locate a less squeamish lawyer than to
refrain from bringing the SLAPP at all.
C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
A SLAPP may be brought for intentional interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage, although the SLAPP defendant may be able to
defeat some or all of the prima facie elements of this tort. Briefly, the
elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective business
advantage are: (1) an existing economic relationship between plaintiff
and a third party that probably will economically benefit plaintiff in the
future; (2) defendant's knowledge of this relationship; (3) defendant's
intentional and successful disruption of the relationship; and (4) damage
proximately caused by the actions of the defendant.1 13
SLAPP cases have provided an important gloss on some of these
elements. For example, the relationship between the SLAPP plaintiff
and a third party must be economic, not regulatory. In Asia Investment
Co. v. Borowski,1 14 a city was the third-party plaintiff and the plaintiff
developer was required to obtain permits from the city. 5' The court
held that the developer and the city were not in an economic relationship
149. See Brecher, supra note 29, at 136-37.
150. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5. For comparable sanction rules from other states, see
John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions,
14 HoFSITRA L. REv. 433, 457-68 (1986).
151. Brecher, supra note 29, at 137.
152. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 410, 417, 424, 427.
153. Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 840-41, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323
(1982); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 129-130 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing interference with contractual relations and interference
with prospective business advantage).
154. 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982).
155. Id at 836, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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and that the only economic relationship the plaintiff had (if any) was
with future home buyers."5 6 In addition, because the development had
not yet been approved, the court found that there was no "existing rela-
tionship" with which the defendant could have tortiously interfered. 7
More importantly in the SLAPP context, no privileged statement can
constitute such tortious interference. 58 As with all defenses against
prima facie elements of SLAPPs, these substantive defenses allow de-
fendants to win at trial, but do not thwart a SLAPP's effectiveness in
delaying or intimidating.
D. Defamation and Opinion
In the SLAPP context, which often involves environmentalists and
slow-growth activists speaking out against development projects, the
most relevant aspect of defamation jurisprudence is the opinion privi-
lege. 5 9 In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co. , 6 federal courts do not expressly recognize a sepa-
rate opinion privilege. 6' The analysis of allegedly defamatory language
in this context, however, remains largely unchanged. Both California
and federal courts examine the language itself and its backdrop in the
actual publication, as well as'in its larger social and political setting. 62
They consider whether that language is mere puffing or political bluster
156. Id. at 841, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 841-42, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24 (explaining that privileged statement is one
that falls within ambit of California Civil Code § 47, which was enacted to provide litigants
utmost freedom of access to courts without fear of retaliatory lawsuits); Brody v. Montalbano,
87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 738, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215 (1978), cert denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979);
Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13,20, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 (1978).
These cases involved the absolute privilege for communications during legislative or judicial
proceedings under California Civil Code § 47(2) (West 1982) (now codified at CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 47(b) (West Supp. 1992)). See infra text accompanying note 215.
159. The opinion privilege originally stemmed from dicta in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974): "[Tlhere is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas." Id.; see also Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One
Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding principle that statements of
opinion are not actionable); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 600-01,
552 P.2d 425, 427-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643-44 (1976) (holding that statements of opinion
are constitutionally protected and not subject to suit for libel).
160. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
161. Id. at 2707.
162. See, eg., iad at 2704-05; Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Alffliated Publications, 953 F.2d
724, 727 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Exam-
iner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 264-68, 721 P.2d 87, 93-96, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206,-212-15 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:395
during a heated debate, or whether it conveys undisclosed knowledge of
wrongdoing of which the defendant is accusing the plaintiff.
163
The "undisclosed facts" analysis is parallel to that found in section
566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.164 The Court in Milkovich
held that statements about matters of public concern that "imply an as-
sertion of objective fact" that is both false and defaming, are actiona-
ble.1 6' The crux of the analysis is whether the alleged defamation
actually accused the plaintiff of some verifiable wrongdoing or crime.
For example, the Milkovich majority believed that the defendant's col-
umn accused the plaintiff of committing perjury.
166
In contrast, had the defendant accused the plaintiff of being "a
jerk," this would have been a nonactionable opinion or "rhetorical hy-
perbole." 167 The defendant in Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc. 168 used the
word "shady" to describe the plaintiff bar owners. The court found this
language to be rhetorical hyperbole because "shady" is an opinion word
that cannot be proven true or false and because it does not depend on
undisclosed facts. 169 Similarly, the defendant in Letter Carriers v. Austin
used Jack London's famous characterization of a scab as "'a traitor to
his god, his country, his family and his class' "to describe the plaintiff. 17
The Supreme Court easily rejected the plaintiff's contention that the de-
fendant was literally accusing the plaintiff of treason against the United
States.71 In Karnell v. Campbell 172 the defendant's statements that the
163. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-07; Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., 232 Cal.
App. 3d 991, 999, 283 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649 (1991).
164. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1965); see, e.g., Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at
2710 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 451-52, 629 P.2d
1369, 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981).
165. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
166. Id. at 2707.
167. Id. at 2705.
168. 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983).
169. Id. at 48; see also Okun, 29 Cal. 3d at 452, 629 P.2d at 1374-75, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 451-
52 (stating that defendant's editorializing words such as "mysterious" and "amazingly" im-
plied no hidden knowledge but rather colored defendant's letters to newspaper with opinion).
170. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268 (1974) (quoting "a well known piece of
trade union literature, generally attributed to author Jack London," entitled The Scab).
171. Id. at 284; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (noting
jury determination that ad parody did not describe actual facts about plaintiff); Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that no reader could have
believed speaker's use of word "blackmail" at public meeting meant speaker was accusing
plaintiff of blackmail). In Hustler, evangelist Jerry Fawell sued Hustler Magazine over a sa-
tiric ad parody that portrayed Falwell as a drunken reprobate having sex with his mother in an
outhouse. 485 U.S. at 48. The Hustler Court decided that none of these depictions could
"reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about" plaintiff Jerry Falwell. Id. at 57.
172. 501 A.2d 1029 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
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plaintiff developer "robbed" and "raped" the defendant's town; got
favorable zoning breaks "under false pretenses" and through "clever ma-
neuvering"; and had to have known about a town government appraisal
mistake173 were found by the court to be rhetorical and postured, because
the statements implied no unknown facts.
174
California and federal courts have adopted the "totality of circum-
stances" analysis from the seminal case of Olman v. Evans.1 75 Essen-
tially, this analysis looks at the speech, first by itself and then in its larger
context. 176 The rhetorical, posturing epithets just described are good il-
lustrations of specific language that is not actionable. In addition, some
courts have emphasized qualifying words that express doubt, such as
"seems" or "appears." 177 Simply adding such qualifiers, however, will
not sanitize otherwise defamatory remarks.1 78 The Milkovich majority
pointed out that "the statement, 'In my opinion Jones is a liar,' can cause
as much damage to reputation as the statement, 'Jones is a liar,' " and
that such a "statement may still imply a false assertion of fact."
' 179
The totality of the circumstances analysis always considers the state-
ments at issue as a whole and within their larger contexts.1 80 The typical
SLAPP context of a political row involving a citizen, environmentalist or
173. Id. at 1032.
174. Id at 1035-36.
175. 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Under the
four-prong Olman test, the court reviews: (1) the specific language itself, (2) the entire publi-
cation; (3) the surrounding circumstances; and (4) a reasonable viewer or reader reaction. Id.
at 979. Other courts have applied a similar three-prong test which includes: (1) a reasonable
viewer or reader reaction; (2) the surrounding circumstances; and (3) the specific language
itself. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th
Cir. 1980); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-61, 721 P.2d 87, 90-
91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-10 (1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
176. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979.
177. Genesis, 611 F.2d at 784; see also Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "'when the reasonable reader encounters cautionary language, he tends to
"discount that which follows" ' " (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (1984), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985))).
178. Compare Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (" '[It] would be destructive of the law of libel
if a writer could escape liability.., simply by using... the words "I think."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)))
with Carr v. Warden, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 1168-69; 206 Cal. Rptr. 162, 163 (1984) (holding
that "I think" was enough to signal opinion rather than fact).
179. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
180. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-61, 721 P.2d 87, 90-91,
228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209 (1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Hoffman Co. v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 390, 398, 248 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (1988); see also
Genesis, 611 F.2d at 783-84 (stating that words alone are not indicative of defamation unless
surrounding facts are also considered).
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other protest group, will tend to suggest that verbal or written accusa-
tions are nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole.'"
The Milkovich opinion explicitly denied that the famous dicta in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ' 2 -"there is no such thing as a false idea"-
had created a separate opinion privilege under the First Amendment.
1 3
Both the majority' and the dissent"" stated that the existing constitu-
tional protections are adequate to protect freedom of expression without
the addition of a separate opinion privilege. These protections include:
(1) the Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps "I requirement that a def-
amation plaintiff show the falsity of the statements on matters of public
concern that are at issue; (2) the rhetorical hyperbole and totality of the
circumstances analyses; and (3) the fault standards from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 187 and Gertz.' Milkovich is expressly based on
the Federal Constitution and in fact the Court rejected the defendants'
independent state grounds argument." 9 As long as California courts fol-
low the perimeters of Michigan v. Long, 9 0 they could reaffirm a separate
opinion privilege under the California Constitution.
Finally, Milkovich reconfirmed the New York Times Co. actual mal-
ice standard, which was initially applied to public officials and later ex-
tended to public figures. 9 ' Note that public-figure status need not be
181. Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. F011230, slip op. at 8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991)
(finding that ad published by defendant farmers in context of "heated political campaign" over
Peripheral Canal contained "clear speculation"). But the Milkovich majority rejects a small-
town setting as a factor, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 n.9, and ignores the sports-page context, which the
state supreme court found " 'a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,' "id. at
2701 n.4. Contrast Olman, which stated that the context of an Op-Ed page article clearly
indicated opinion. 750 F.2d at 985.
182. 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
183. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
184. Id at 2706-07.
185. Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986).
187. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
188. 418 U.S. at 347.
189. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701 n.5.
190. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that state court opinions are presumed to be based on
federal constitutional grounds unless opinion clearly states that it is based on adequate and
independent state grounds). The Lockyer bill addressed the "right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution," thus leaving open an independent state
grounds reading of this anti-SLAPP bill. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
191. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703; see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
134 (1967) (applying actual malice standard when plaintiff is public figure); New York Times
Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80, 285-86 (plaintiff must show with "convincing clarity" that defendant
had actual malice, requiring intentional or reckless disregard of defamatory statement's
falsity).
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permanent. Plaintiffs who prominently hold themselves out in the com-
munity on one particular matter or project are public figures as to that
one matter or project. 92 Thus, SLAPP plaintiffs must often show actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence, even though those plaintiffs are
otherwise private individuals.19 3 In New York, the Gaffney-Lavalle Bill
mandates an actual malice standard in defamation cases in which a plain-
tiff applies to a public agency for a permit or license, by making the
plaintiff a public figure statutorily.194
Overall, then, defamation law affords both SLAPP plaintiffs and de-
fendants their respective protections. If a plaintiff stands accused of ac-
tual verifiable wrongdoing and can prove reckless disregard on the part
of the defendants, the plaintiff's defamation action will lie. On the other
hand, defendants hurling opinionated and even outrageous epithets in the
course of a heated political battle, without literally accusing plaintiffs of
crimes or actual wrongdoing, can expect the full protection of the
Constitution.
E. The Right to Petition the Government; Petitioning Privileges; and
the Noerr/Pennington Doctrine
1. The right and its importance
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances pro-
tects citizens' rights of political advocacy. 19 Petitioning activity in-
cludes lobbying the government, suing, testifying, demonstrating
peacefully, writing letters and boycotting.'9 6 First Amendment rights in-
clude "[t]he right of public debate, including the right to publish truthful
statements, the right to demonstrate in public and the right to report
violations or make complaints to government bodies."' 9 7 Courts will not
interfere with the exercise of the right to petition absent sham or fraud,
192. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
193. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703.04.
194. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 528.
195. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
196. See Pring, supra note 1, at 9-12. In Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo.
1979), NOW's concerted effort to boycott conventions in Missouri-a state that did not ratify
the Equal Rights Amendment-was held to be conspiratorial but privileged because it was
political, rather than economic or commercial. Id at 304-06. NOW's First Amendment
rights to petition and freely associate "outweigh[ed Missouri's] interest in protecting the busi-
ness expectancy involved." Id. at 305-06.
197. Goedert, supra note 15, at 1003; see also Boyle, supra note 13, at 9 (describing Jay
Property SLAPP, in which "an alliance of local, county and state civic, historical and environ-
mental groups calling itself the Jay Coalition" got county to acquire plaintiff's development
land by eminent domain because of its historic value).
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or in some cases, even with sham or fraud.198 The activity need not en-
tail direct contact with the government or its representatives in order to
be constitutionally protected as petitioning activity. For example, in
Webb v. Fury,199 the.court held that the defendant's newsletter was pro-
tected, even if the defendant's motive was subjectively malicious: "The
right to petition includes.., activity designed to influence public senti-
ment concerning the passage and enforcement of laws as well as appeals
for redress made directly to the government." 2"
The right to petition is a powerful constitutional right and the most
effective defense to a SLAPP.201 California and federal courts repeatedly
stress the fundamental and paramount importance of the right to peti-
tion.2"2 A defendant's failure to raise the right to petition defense does
not waive it.20 3 Some state courts have found that the petition defense to
SLAPPs is superior to defamation defenses such as those relating to the
opinion-fact dichotomy, because petitioning may be privileged even if it
includes knowingly false statements.2° And the right to petition does
198. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511
(1972); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 937-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See infra notes 212-23
and accompanying text for a discussion of the sham exception and absolute privileges.
199. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
200. Id. at 42.
201. Pring's study found that "raising the Petition Clause defense almost doubled [defend-
ants'] chances of ultimately winning: [Defendants] won 57 percent of those SLAPPs in which
the Petition Clause was never invoked, but 92 percent of those SLAPPs in which it was."
Pring, supra note 15, at *37.
Note that SLAPP defendants' First Amendment rights, through the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, can provide defenses to SLAPPs by private as well
as public plaintiffs. See Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1528, 1544, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 514, 522 (1991). The "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause is satisfied by the mere involvement of the legal system as an instrument of
the state. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964); Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691-97 (1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
202. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967); Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 936; Matossian v. Fahmie, 101 Cal. App. 3d 128, 135, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 532, 535 (1980) (citing American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d
167, 10 Pal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 819 (1961)); see also Edwards, 397
F.2d at 690 n.7 (noting "it is clear beyond peradventure that [the right of the people to petition
the government for redress of grievances] is at the core of protected First Amendment
speech.").
203. See Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass'n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
204. See Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 42-43 (finding malice standard inappropriate in petition cases
and concluding statements in publication absolutely privileged under First Amendment).
The dissent in Webb took issue with the court's disregard of malice. Id. at 43 (Neely, J.,
dissenting). Dissenting Justice Neely opined that there should be no absolute privilege for
petitioning activity and that knowingly false or fraudulent petitioning should not be protected.
Id at 44-45 (Neely, J., dissenting). Both the majority and the dissent seemed to agree, how-
ever, that if petitioning is merely to stop a competitor-or for some other sham purpose-and
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not hinge on the case's outcome on the merits.2 °5 California courts have
afforded defendants a potent petitioning privilege even if a plaintiff can
show that a defendant was malicious.20 6 Significantly, the United States
Supreme Court, in McDonald v. Smith,2 "7 expressly stated that petition-
ing activity is not absolutely privileged and that "there is no sound basis
for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition... than other First Amendment expressions."20 8
Although the tolerance of actual malice is not entirely clear, courts
have universally declared that common-law malice, or ill will, will not
defeat the petitioning privilege.209 Because people or companies do not
usually petition the government unless they have some personal or finan-
cial interest at stake, allowing personal bias or common-law malice to
neutralize their petitioning privilege would effectively eliminate this priv-
ilege in all but those rare instances in which a citizen or group sought
government participation solely for altruistic or civic-minded pur-
poses.210 The landmark Supreme Court case of Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ,2 I extended the petitioning privi-
lege to defendants who were financially interested in the subject matter of
their petitioning, and were therefore inferably malicious or at least self-
ishly motivated.
not to influence the government, then it should not be privileged. Ia at 42-43; id at 46
(Neely, J., dissenting).
205. Matossian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
206. Id., 161 Cal. Rptr. at 537. These California courts followed the holdings in Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Brecher reads Matossian as
declaring an absolute privilege in California, Brecher, supra note 29, at -120-21, but actually
the case merely confirmed the irrelevance of common-law malice-self-interested motivation
or ill will-in petitioning cases. Matosyian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536. In
fact, Matossian held onto the Noerr/Pennington sham exception. Id at 138-39, 161 Cal. Rptr.
at 537-38.
207. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
208. Id. at 485 (applying New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), actual
malice standard).
209. Id.; Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Anchorage Joint
Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass'n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); see
Brecher, supra note 29, at 119.
210. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 938; Matossian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 138-39, 161 Cal. Rptr. at
537.
211. 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
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2. The Noerr/Pennington sham exception to the petitioning privilege
Under the Noerr/Pennington doctrine, or sham exception rule,212
petitioning activity must at least partly make an attempt to influence gov-
ernment. Petitioning cannot be, for example, completely to prevent a
competitor from gaining access to government; the petitioner must be
genuinely seeking redress. 213 A Massachusetts court in Bell v. Mazza 214
refused to immunize petitioning per se. The plaintiffs sued on a theory of
interference with constitutional property rights (their right to build a ten-
nis court), and the defendants allegedly threatened, intimidated and co-
erced them in response;215 the fact of the defendants' petitioning activity
in conjunction with the case was not sufficient for the court to dismiss the
plaintiffs' state civil rights claim, especially considering the defendants'
alleged wrongdoing.216
Under the sham exception, a party's petitioning activity will not be
constitutionally protected if it is solely for an improper purpose such as
blocking another party's access to government or gaining an unfair ad-
vantage over a competitor. Basically, a party may have one of those ma-
licious motives as long as it has some other, legitimate reason for its
petitioning. As discussed, the petitioning defendant's "intent is irrele-
vant," 217 except to the extent that a petition containing damaging false-
hoods made with actual malice may remove the petitioner's privilege.218
The majority in Webb v. Fury drew the line at whether the defendant's
petitioning activity actually blocked the plaintiff's own access to govern-
ment.219 In Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court,220
212. The original line of cases articulating the Supreme Court's sham exception rules was in
the antitrust area. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. at 144. Subsequent courts, however, have applied the sham exception outside the
antitrust setting. See, eg., Matossian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536;
Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Colo. 1984).
213. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 36 (W. Va. 1981).
214. 474 N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985).
215. Id. at 1114. The defendant allegedly threatened to sue the plaintiffs' contractor, tried
to induce the electric company to discontinue the plaintiffs' electric service, physically blocked
one plaintiff's passage, and shouted "intemperate epithets." Id.
216. d at 1112-16.
217. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 41.
218. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1985); see supra notes 209-11 and accom-
panying text.
219. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 39-40 (holding that defendant must have "a design to thwart the
plaintiff's input into the political process. Conduct which prevents a party from participating
in [any of the] branches of government is not petitioning activity protected by" First Amend-
ment (citation omitted)).
220. 677 P.2d 1361, 1367-69 (Colo. 1984).
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a Colorado court broke the sham exception into three elements. To de-
feat defendant's petitioning privilege, plaintiff must show that: (1) de-
fendant's petitioning claims are without reasonable factual or legal
basis;221 (2) defendant's "primary purpose ... was to harass the plaintiff
or to effectuate some other improper objective"; 222 and (3) defendant's
action "had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the
plaintiff."
223
3. California's Section 47(b) privilege
California Civil Code Section 47(b) establishes a potent privilege for
communications made during legislative or judicial proceedings.224 The
communication may be written or oral, and it may be a communication
made outside formal agency proceedings in order "to prompt action by
that agency. '22' But a privileged statement must have "some connection
or logical relation" to the proceedings regardless of whether the state-
ment is made outside the courtroom or hearing.226 Any official proceed-
221. Id. at 1369. The fact that the defendant lost in a previous suit in itself does not mean
the previous suit was a sham. Id
222. Id Commentator Sive objects to this element because it encourages discovery into a
defendant's motives. Sive, supra note 29, at *4. Impropriety of motive, however, seems to be
the essence both of the sham exception and the definition of SLAPPs in general. California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972), provides good illustra-
tions of improper motives, such as perjury, bribery and misrepresentation. In California Motor
Transp. Co., the true intent of the defendant allegedly was to prevent the plaintiffs from invok-
ing the processes of administrative agencies and courts. Id at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Similarly, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), a private power
company tried to freeze out municipal competitors and "'preserve its predominant position in
the sale and transmission of electric power in the area"' through improper litigation. Id. at
379 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
223. Protect Our Mountain Env't, 677 P.2d at 1369. This element is really just a standing
requirement. Sive, supra note 29, at *9.
224. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) (West Supp. 1992); see also Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d
205, 215-16, 786 P.2d 365, 370, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 644-45 (1990) (stating that privilege is
applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to publication); Pettitt v. Levy,
28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 488, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1972) (stating that privilege is absolute
because it protects publications made with actual malice or with intent to do harm); Brecher,
supra note 29, at 121 (stating that section establishes privilege for any publication or broadcast
made during legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding authorized by law).
225. King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 104 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1972).
226. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 212, 786 P.2d at 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642; accord Asia Inv. Co.
v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 842, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324 (1982). "The usual formula-
tion is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects
of the litigation; and (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action." Silberg,
50 Cal. 3d at 212, 786 P.2d at 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
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ing authorized by law comes within the purview of Section 47(b).2 27 The
privilege also implies that defamatory statements made in "proceedings
which resemble judicial and legislative proceedings, such as transactions
of administrative boards and quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceed-
ings .... having some relation thereto are absolutely privileged. '228 Sec-
tion 47(b) covers all papers and communications relating to litigation.229
Although this statutory privilege may immunize petitioners from liability
stemming from their statements, those statements may be used as evi-
dence against the petitioners in a subsequent action.230 The immunity
applies regardless of actual or common-law malice.231 This potent privi-
lege can block many different tort actions, such as defamation, abuse of
process and intentional interference with prospective economic advan-
tage; subsequent malicious prosecution actions, however, are not barred
by the Section 47(b) privilege.
2 32
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) ("A privileged publication or broadcast is one made... [i]n
any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized
by law.").
228. King, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The privilege's scope is broad, as
agency investigations are also included. See id. Courts outside California have also recognized
absolute privileges for communications and legislative proceedings. See Walters v. Linhof, 559
F. Supp. 1231, 1236-37 (D. Colo. 1983); McEvoy, supra note 4, at 520.
229. See, e.g., Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 786 P.2d at 369-70, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43
(discussing privileged status of statements by parties and witnesses under former Civil Code
§ 47(2), now codified at § 47(b)); Asia Inv. Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 325
(petition for writ of mandate); O'Neil v. Cunningham, 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 173 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1981) (settlement letters and statements in settlement conferences); Lerette v. Dean Wit-
ter Org., Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578-79, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1976) (demand letters);
King, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17 (pleadings, except in dissolution of
marriage actions); Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 488, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1972)
(witness statements and statements by parties).
230. See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.
3d 1157, 1168, 728 P.2d 1202, 1208-09, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574 (1986). In Oren's predecessor
action, the plaintiff neighbor tried to stop the defendant developer's construction by suing for
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violations. Id. at 1157, 728 P.2d at 1202, 232
Cal. Rptr. at 567. Then in Oren, the developer, now the plaintiff, claimed that the neighbor
offered to drop his CEQA complaints for money and a lot in the proposed development. Id. at
1160-61, 728 P.2d at 1203, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69. The California Supreme Court allowed
the neighbor's alleged offer to be admitted into evidence in the second action (for abuse of
process) even though the statement was privileged. Id. at 1170, 728 P.2d at 1210, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 575.
231. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 216, 786 P.2d at 371, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 645; Royer v. Steinberg,
90 Cal. App. 3d 490, 498, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (1979); Brecher, supra note 29, at 122. In
Pettitt, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, the court granted immunity to defendants
who forged an official application, and in Kachig v. Boothe, 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 99 Cal. Rptr.
393 (1971), the court immunized perjury.
232. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 216, 786 P.2d at 371, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (discussing former
Civil Code § 47(2), now codified at § 47(b)).
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The constitutional right to petition and California's statutory privi-
lege for communications during legislative or judicial proceedings under
Section 47(b) are the strongest defenses available to SLAPP defend-
ants.233 Successfully raising these defenses at an early dismissal stage
may undercut significantly the SLAPP plaintiff's efforts at intimidation,
expense and delay. A SLAPP defendant will need companion protec-
tions as well, however, to eliminate the effects of the SLAPP. Only the
specter of serious negative consequences will deter SLAPP plaintiffs.
2 34
The defenses discussed above can only counter a SLAPP once it is filed;
they cannot deter the plaintiff from filing it.
V. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: SLAPP-BACKS
SLAPP-backs are separate countersuits or counterclaims to
SLAPPs, usually for abuse of process or malicious, prosecution, by
SLAPP defendants. There is. debate as to their effectiveness. While they
may allow vindication, a SLAPP-back victory may be too little, too late.
SLAPP-back theories are either rare and elusive-as with the constitu-
tional tort theory in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Founda-
tion 23 5-or disfavored and difficult to prove-as with abuse of process
and malicious prosecution.
The prospect of huge damage awards for the original SLAPP de-
fendants "particularly in California, ' '236 may well discourage the initial
filings of SLAPPs.237 Business groups and SLAPP plaintiffs contend
that "the anti-SLAPP campaign could itself intrude on important legal
rights .... [and] could deter businesses and others from going to court
with legitimate grievances because of the threat of big jury awards.
238
Spectacular damage awards in SLAPP-backs are widely publicized 239 but
233. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b).
234. See infra part VI discussing damages and attorney's fees.
235. 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 853-54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 817 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459
U.S. 1192 (1983); see also Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 445-46 (discussing briefly
SLAPP-back theories).
236. Boyle, supra note 13, at 8. For example, three farmers eventually won a multi-million
dollar judgment against agribusiness giant 1.G. Boswell Company. Costantini & Nash, supra
note 4, at 426.
237. Clavin, supra note 61, at 51.
238. Hager, supra note 18, at A3. Ron Galperin quotes law professor and development
consultant Gideon Kanner: "'These people [anti-development advocates] come out of the
woodwork'. . . and have become 'drunk with power.' . . . [H]is advice to developers thinking
about a lawsuit is 'don't do it.'" Galperin, supra note 4, at K15 (alteration in original).
239. See, eg., Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426 (jury awarded plaintiff $13 million
against defendant J.G. Boswell Company in Thompson v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. 179027 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Kern County July 14, 1988)); Boyle, supra note 13, at 8 (reporting on SLAPP-back
suits involving J.G. Boswell Company and Shell Oil Corporation); Clavin, supra note 61, at 51
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notably infrequent. 2' Greater publicity can exert only a negative effect
on SLAPP filings, but sources disagree over whether it has had any effect
at all.241 Ironically, well-publicized successful SLAPP-backs may also
discourage legitimate plaintiffs from filing colorable claims-as opposed
to SLAPPs. All of these considerations, of course, depend on the aver-
age size of the awards. If modest, potential SLAPP plaintiffs may in-
clude SLAPP-back awards with costs and fees as an acceptable cost of
doing business.
Despite the questionable chilling effect of SLAPP-back awards,
SLAPP-backs do not actually prevent the negative effects of SLAPPs,
such as delay, initial cost and intimidation. Additionally, a SLAPP de-
fendant cannot bring a malicious prosecution SLAPP-back until the
SLAPP has terminated in the defendant's favor.242 By the time a
SLAPP victim can win a SLAPP-back years later, a plaintiff developer
has probably long since broken ground or obtained government ap-
proval. Furthermore, the dim prospect of a SLAPP-back victory usually
will not alleviate the chill of a SLAPP for the typical SLAPP defendant.
Nor will most defendants be able to cover the litigation costs up front.
Finally, a SLAPP-back will tie up a protest group's resources even longer
than defending a SLAPP.
In addition a SLAPP-back plaintiff-the original SLAPP defend-
ant-may not be able to meet the requisite burden of proof on the merits.
A malicious prosecution plaintiff, for example, must show that the plain-
tiff in the original suit had no probable cause to sue,243 which is a difficult
threshold showing.
The SLAPP-back theories outlined below all share the elements of
intent and damage.2 4 Commentators Costantini and Nash's analysis of
(describing SLAPP-back suit against Shell Oil Corporation); Slapping back at SL4PP suits,
supra note 18, at B6.
240. The best known case of a court awarding such large damages is found in Thompson v.
J.G. Boswell Co., No. 179027 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern County July 14, 1988), aff'd, Wegis v.
J.G. Boswell Co., No. F011230 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991).
241. Compare Hager, supra note 18, at A3 ("now the tide seems to be turning" and
SLAPP-backs are deterring SLAPPs) with Galperin, supra note 4, at Kl (noting that SLAPP
suits are on rise).
242. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845-48, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
181 (1971); Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 837-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321
(1982); Brecher, supra note 29, at 138. See infra text accompanying notes 290-304 for propos-
als to modify this element so as to permit a counterclaim for malicious prosecution as part of
the initial SLAPP.
243. Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 494, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955); Jaffe v. Stone, 18
Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 337 (1941).
244. See infra notes 252-300 and accompanying text.
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the Thompson v. J. G. Boswell Co. 245 case illustrates the pitfalls of proving
wrongful intent on the part of the original SLAPP plaintiff.2" The larg-
est farming company in California, the J.G. Boswell Company,
SLAPPed three small farmers who had taken out a newspaper advertise-
ment opposing Boswell's position on the hotly contested Peripheral Ca-
nal.247 In the first trial the judge rejected Boswell's libel claim because a
reasonable reader could in no way infer allegations of an actual conspir-
acy from the advertisement.248 In the second action, the SLAPP-back,
the plaintiffs had to prove Boswell's wrongful intent in the first action
through both circumstantial and direct evidence.249 The circumstantial
evidence of ulterior motives pointed out that Boswell was rich, sophisti-
cated and politically powerful 25 -- he had his own political action com-
mittee; he had invested over $1 million before the advertisement
appeared in the newspaper and wanted to protect his investment; and he
often played "hardball," which included using litigation and boycotting
suppliers who did not support his political causes.251 Direct evidence
that the first action was not brought in good faith showed that Boswell
never investigated his alleged losses from damage to his reputation; he
consulted inexperienced local counsel rather than his regularly retained
large firm; and he decided to sue even before consulting his local
lawyer.
252
A. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process entails using an otherwise proper or legitimate
lawsuit for some improper, collateral purpose. Its elements are: (1) an
"ulterior motive"; (2) wrongful use of process; 253 and (3) proximate
causation of damage or harm.25 4 A plaintiff in the first action-the de-
245. No. 179027 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern County July 14, 1988), aff'd, Wegis v. J.G. Boswell
Co., No. F011230 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991).
246. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 446-64.
247. Id. at 428. The Peripheral Canal proposition would provide an alternative method of
transporting water to the arid part of the state.
248. Id. at 440.
249. Id at 446-47.
250. Id. at 454-57.
251. Id. at 448.
252. Id. at 463. It should be noted that, although the Family Farmers won their SLAPP-
back suit against the J.G. Boswell Company, Boswell's original libel suit effectively silenced
the Family Farmers for the remainder of the political battle over the Peripheral Canal. IM. at
470.
253. Brecher, supra note 29, at 128.
254. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 444-45. As with the petitioning defense, defend-
ant's common-law malice or ill will is not a sufficient "ulterior motive," or most suits would
qualify. Id at 445.
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fendant in the abuse of process SLAPP-back-must have used the first
lawsuit as a threat or to blackmail. For example, in Spellens v. Spellens,
the California Supreme Court found that the defendant husband had
abused the process of the courts against his plaintiff wife.2"5 When the
plaintiff wife sued her husband for marriage by estoppel, the husband
tried to seize the wife's car, not because he thought he had a legitimate
claim to the car but because he wanted to force his wife to drop her main
cause of action.25 6
Abuse of process and malicious prosecution have distinct focuses.
Abuse of process aims at properly issued process that is subsequently
used "as a threat or a club,.., a form of extortion. ' '25 7 Malicious prose-
cution, on the other hand, focuses on an action that never should have
been brought.258 Abuse of process, then, is procedural in that it is unre-
lated to the merits of the underlying original action.2" 9 Consequently, a
plaintiff in the second suit or counterclaimant in the first suit need not
win a first suit on the merits before initiating an abuse of process ac-
tion.2" Nor is the initial plaintiff's probable cause to bring the SLAPP
relevant in an abuse of process case. Therefore, the abuse of process the-
ory may be attractive to a defendant when the plaintiff's initial action
was legitimate-that is, not a SLAPP. To illustrate, assume a defendant
really defamed a plaintiff; but when the plaintiff later makes it clear in a
private conference that the defamation action is solely to force the de-
fendant to drop the defendant's collateral complaint to an environmental
agency about the plaintiff's development, the defendant may have an
abuse of process claim.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The most common SLAPP-back theory is malicious prosecution.
Huge potential damage awards are its major attraction. Its major draw-
back is the delay caused by the prima facie requirement that the mali-
cious prosecution plaintiff must have won the initial suit in which he or
255. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 233, 317 P.2d 613, 627 (1957).
256. Id at 230, 317 P.2d at 625.
257. Id at 232, 317 P.2d at 6i7 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 100
(2d ed. 1955)); see also Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma,
Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 1169, 728 P.2d 1202, 1209-10, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575 (1986) (explaining
that "lack of probable cause" element of malicious prosecution cannot be circumvented by
expanding abuse of process to encompass alleged improper filing of lawsuit).
258. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d at 232, 317 P.2d at 626; see infra part V.B for a discussion of
malicious prosecution.
259. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d at 232, 317 P.2d at 626.
260. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 527.
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she was the defendant.261 Much of the scholarly discussion on malicious
prosecution in the SLAPP context centers around this latter element, of
which some commentators have proposed modifications such as allowing
malicious prosecution as a counterclaim in the initial action, the SLAPP,
rather than waiting until the second action, the SLAPP-back.262
The prima facie elements of malicious prosecution are as follows.
The plaintiff must show that the defendant "initiated or took an active
part in the commencement or maintenance of" the first-malicious-
action.263 The malicious prosecution plaintiff must have won the first
action, or the action must have "terminated in plaintiff's favor." 2  The
defendant must not have had probable cause for bringing or maintaining
the first suit 265 -the SLAPP. Finally, plaintiff must show that the origi-
nal plaintiff filed the first action maliciously, for an improper purpose.
266
In malicious prosecution, the filing of the suit itself is improper because
the plaintiff had no probable cause and a malicious purpose.267 Basically,
the malicious prosecution plaintiff contends that the predecessor action
was brought without any "relation to the merits of the claim" and that
the original plaintiff did not believe that claim was valid.268
Malicious prosecution defendants have an advice-of-counsel de-
fense.269 To successfully raise this defense, defendants must show that
they acted in good faith in seeking and in following their lawyer's advice
during the first action.270 The defendant must have sought and followed
261. See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d' 335, 337 (1941).
262. See Brecher, supra note 29, at 138-40; infra text accompanying note 288.
263. Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d
1157, 1169, 728 P.2d 1202, 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575 (1986); Costantini & Nash, supra
note 4, at 443.
264. Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 496, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955).
265. Id.
266. Oren Royal Oaks, 42 Cal. 3d at 1169, 728 P.2d at 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
Malice is difficult to prove. A plaintiff cannot show evidence of a pattern of similar im-
proper lawsuits for the purpose of proving defendant's" guilt or liability, because such a pattern
is irrelevant. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1960 & Supp. 1992); Larson v. Larsen, 72
Cal. App. 169, 172, 236 P. 979, 980-81 (1925). Although Larson was a criminal case, this
principle also applies in a civil setting. Id. In addition, because malicious prosecution focuses
on the impropriety offiling the suit without probable cause, the plaintiff's conduct after filing
is also irrelevant. Brecher, supra note 29, at 127.
267. Part II.C supra discusses SLAPP plaintiffs' improper motivations.
268. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 383, 295 P.2d 405, 411 (1956); Brecher, supra
note 29, at 127. Brecher adds that an improper purpose might include suits brought "primar-
ily because of hostility or ill will," or merely to deprive defendant "of the beneficial use of his
property." Id. Brecher's iln-will category seems contrary to the Noerr/Pennington doctrine, at
least if petitioning activity is entailed. See supra part IV.E.
269. Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1967); Brecher,
supra note 29, at 126; Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 444 n.87.
270. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 444 n.87.
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the attorney's advice before commencing or maintaining the first action
and must have made "full, fair and complete disclosure" to the lawyer of
all relevant information known by the defendant.271 Finally, the defend-
ant must have believed that the plaintiff was liable.272
The central element in the SLAPP debate is that the first action
must have been "terminated in [the plaintiff's] favor. ' 273 First, the mali-
cious prosecution plaintiff need have won only some substantial aspect of
the first action. For example, in Sierra Club v. Superior Court,274 the
court remanded the case after the Sierra Club successfully argued that an
incorrect administrative standard had been used. After it won that bat-
tle, however, the Sierra Club lost the war, because the developer was
eventually allowed to build.275 The developer sued the Sierra Club for
malicious prosecution based on the action that resulted in the remand,
but the court found that the favorable termination element had not been
satisfied.276
The gravamen of the "favorable" element is whether the dismissal
or other termination of the first action went to the merits.277 "A termi-
nation is therefore 'favorable' if its nature is such as to indicate the inno-
cence of the accused. If, on the other hand, 'the dismissal is on technical
grounds, for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent
with his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination.' "278 Termi-
nations on technical grounds such as laches, collateral estoppel or the
running of the limitations period are not on the merits, whereas dismissal
for lack of evidence constitutes favorable termination because it indicates
that the plaintiff had no case in the first action.279
Commentator Brecher proposes that the common-law malicious
prosecution action be allowed as a counterclaim in the first action, con-
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
181 (1971); accord Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 337 (1941).
274. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 214 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985).
275. Id. at 1143, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
276. Id at 1144, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 745-46.
277. Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 750, 602 P.2d 393, 394, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 694
(1979); Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 151, 114 P.2d at 339.
278. Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 837-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321
(1982) (quoting Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1978)).
279. Lackner, 25 Cal. 3d at 751-52, 602 P.2d at 395, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (running of
statute of limitations); Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 150-53, 114 P.2d at 338 (dismissal for lack of
evidence);Asia nv. Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d at 838, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (laches); Brecher, supra
note 29, at 126 (collateral estoppel and laches).
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trary to current precedent.28° A plethora of reasons for the current
scheme make it an elusive target, even for Brecher. In theory, the de-
fendant in the first action cannot pursue a cause of action for malicious
prosecution in the second action until the first action is resolved in his or
her favor; this is the "metaphysical difficulty."2" 1 Following this logic,
allowing a malicious prosecution counterclaim in the first cause of action
is essentially allowing an action before its statute of limitations has
started running.282 In addition, mixing malicious prosecution evidence
against the plaintiff into the original action could prejudice the jury
against the plaintiff's base cause of action. Furthermore, the judge will
decide a counterclaim that seeks only declaratory relief, thus raising the
possibility of inconsistent decisions by the court and the jury.
Malicious prosecution traditionally has been judicially disfavored.283
In the interests of judicial economy, waiting for favorable termination of
the first action could obviate some second actions for malicious prosecu-
tion. Finally, because of the advice-of-counsel defense and because the
plaintiff's lawyer in the first action could conceivably be a co-defendant
in a malicious prosecution claim, the lawyer and the client could be in
conflicting positions. Thus, allowing malicious prosecution as a counter-
claim in the same action could force the plaintiff to retain different
counsel.
Brecher counters many of these arguments mainly by recom-
mending bifurcation of the original claim and the malicious prosecution
counterclaim, which would solve the problem of prejudicial evidence.284
He also recommends that claims and counterclaims be tried by the same
fact-finder-whether judge or jury-to eliminate the problem of an in-
consistent verdict.2 5 He points out that many of the claims are environ-
mental suits or public-interest claims in which the party is seeking
injunctive relief. Because statutes of limitations seek to "repose" and
prevent stale claims, as do many injunctions, Brecher proposes that their
goals are comlatible, thus mitigating the concern with statutes of limita-
tion expressed by the court in Babb v. Superior Court.286 Brecher re-
marks that allowing malicious prosecution counterclaims could actually
280. Brecher, supra note 29, at 137-40. See Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479
P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1971), for current precedent.
281. Babb, 3 Cal. 3d at 846, 479 P.2d at 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
282. Id., 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
283. Id at 847, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182. But see Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 159-60,
114 P.2d at 342-43.
284. Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.
285. Id.
286. 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971); Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.
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reduce litigation, by obviating a second trial. He further contends that if
public-interest or petitioning activities are involved, public policy should
favor malicious prosecution counterclaims.2" 7 Such public-interest situa-
tions could be identified using the criteria set forth in California Civil
Procedure Code Section 1021.5.288
With the current requirement that the first action-the SLAPP-
terminate in favor of the party who will be the malicious prosecution
plaintiff, the only aspect of malicious prosecution that might deter
SLAPPs is the prospect of large damage awards. Although spectacular,
large damage awards are rare.28 9 Malicious prosecution has serious
drawbacks for the SLAPP defendant, in particular, delay and expense.
Even Brecher's proposal to allow malicious prosecution counterclaims in
the SLAPP itself is viable only with bifurcation, as described. 290 Any
comprehensive SLAPP remedy needs to intercept a SLAPP at a much
earlier stage to render it ineffective. Malicious prosecution serves merely
as a last resort.
C. Other Possible SLA PP-Back Theories
SLAPP-back theories other than abuse of process and malicious
prosecution are available. These include intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress,291 federal statutory civil-rights claims, 292 frivolous lawsuit
remedies,293 and the constitutional tort theory.294
The California Court of Appeal in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden
Rain Foundation,29 1 recognized "an action for damages for violation" of
287. Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.
288. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980); Brecher, supra note 29, at 139-40. See
supra part II.A for a discussion of using the public interest element in SLAPP identification.
See infra part VI.B for a discussion of recovering attorney's fees under § 1021.5.
289. For the most noteworthy of a large damage award in a SLAPP-back suit, see supra
note 239 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
291. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 425 n.19.
292. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); Miller and Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Town-
ship Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1272-73 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1213 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 601 P.2d 963,
966-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980).
293. See supra part IV.B for a discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5.
294. See, e.g., Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 848-
56, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 832-37 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983).
295. 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192
(1983).
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state constitutional rights "without the need for enabling legislation."2 96
The rights in Laguna were those of free speech under Article I, Section 2
of the California Constitution. In the SLAPP-back in Wegis v. J. G. Bos-
well Co.,297 the court recognized a constitutional tort claim based on
speech and petitioning rights under the California Constitution.29 8
Under the constitutional tort theory, the SLAPP plaintiff must have "in-
tentionally deprived" the SLAPP defendant-now the SLAPP-back
plaintiff-of his or her constitutional rights, and the deprivation must
have caused damage or harm. 29 9 As constitutional speech and petition-
ing rights are invariably involved in a SLAPP, the constitutional tort is a
particularly appropriate SLAPP-back theory.
All SLAPP-back theories share the disadvantages of delay and cost
to the SLAPP defendants. Although SLAPP-backs may provide even-
tual vindication or, ultimately, substantial damages, their specter usually
will not deter the original SLAPPs, which are designed to delay, intimi-
date, distract and depoliticize.3c ° By the time the SLAPP-back is initi-
ated, it is usually too late.
VI. DAMAGES, ATroRNEY's FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS
What damages, if any, can SLAPP defendants recover? Should the
damage component of an anti-SLAPP scheme aim to make defendants
whole, or rather to prevent plaintiffs' unjust enrichment? Defendants
can obtain tort damages by suing under the SLAPP-back theories dis-
cussed previously. 01 Because most of these theories require a showing of
296. Id. at 853, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835. As far as the self-executing nature of the constitu-
tional right, the Laguna court analogized to the self-executing right to privacy in the Califor-
nia Constitution. Cf White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 106 (1975) (applying new provision to California Constitution recognizing right to privacy
against covert police surveillance of university classes); Porten v. University of San Francisco,
64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828-30, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1976) (providing cause of action for
unauthorized transmittal of private university transcript to scholarship and loan commission).
297. No. F011230 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991).
298. Id. slip op. at 10; see also Laguna Publishing Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 853-54, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 835 (holding that California Constitution gives plaintiff right to sue for damages for
infringement of right of free speech and press); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 445-46
(citing Laguna).
299. Laguna Publishing Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (affording
direct action for damages for intentional constitutional violation); Costantini & Nash, supra
note 4, at 445-46. In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986),
the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a person whose constitutional rights have
been violated may not recover for the pure or abstract infringement of those rights; rather he
or she must have suffered actual damages. Id. at 307-10.
300. See supra part II.C for a discussion of SLAPP plaintiffs' motivations.
301. See supra part V.
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a SLAPP plaintiff's malice in pursuing the SLAPP, punitive damages
may be possible. In addition, a few common-law and statutory theories
are available for recovery of litigation costs and attorney's fees. The one
element that the SLAPP-specific statutes or bills have in common is
some provision for the recovery of costs and fees.3°2
Plaintiffs can of course recover damages-or fees under the theory
in Brandt v. Superior Court 30 3 -ff their lawsuits are not SLAPPs.3 "4
Both the Washington anti-SLAPP statute and a proposed Maryland bill
allow a plaintiff to recover both costs and fees if the plaintiff's suit is
successful. 35  Adding this provision to California's Lockyer bill appar-
ently made the bill more politically palatable 30 6 and will help safeguard a
plaintiff's legitimate rights to bring nonfivolous-nonSLAPP-
lawsuits.
A. Damages
1. Compensatory tort damages
SLAPP-back plaintiffs can recover their actual, out-of-pocket losses
if their SLAPP-back is successful. 30 7 The most obvious out-of-pocket
losses caused by a SLAPP are costs and fees. Theoretically, the SLAPP-
back plaintiff can claim these in California courts under the California
Supreme Court's Brandt theory.3 °8 Brandt allows recovery of attorney's
fees that are in effect tort damages-fees that would not have been in-
curred but for the defendant's tortious action. Therefore, a SLAPP-back
302. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1992); Act of Sept. 16,
1992; S. 51, supra note 106; A. 190, supra note 106; 1991 A. 10721, 215th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess.
(N.Y. 1992).
303. 37 Cal. 3d 813, 693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985); see infra part VI.B.3 for a
discussion of the Brandt theory.
304. At the risk of sounding circular, SLAPPs are by definition meritless, so plaintiffs who
win on the merits were not in fact SLAPP plaintiffs.
305. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520; S. 51, supra note 106. See Conn, supra note 43,
for a discussion of the Maryland bill.
306. The Lockyer bill, in various incarnations, had been vetoed three times by Governors
Deukmejian and Wilson. Governor Wilson finally approved the amended version, which was
enacted on September 16, 1992. The new statute includes the following provision: "If the
court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the
motion, pursuant to Section 128.5." Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)).
307. See McEvoy, supra note 4, at 527.
308. Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 819-20, 693 P.2d 796, 798, 210 Cal. Rptr.
211, 213 (1985) (holding that when insurer's tortious conduct reasonably compels insured to
retain attorney to recover benefits due under policy, insurer should be liable in tort action for
that offense, including attorney's fees).
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plaintiff who has incurred fees to defend against a SLAPP may recover
attorney's fees under Brandt."c
Other direct losses might include lost wages or property.31 0 As a
proximate result of the SLAPP, defendants might have lost valuable in-
surance coverage or access to financing.3 11 Because lost profits are gener-
ally too speculative to calculate, a majority of jurisdictions disallow their
recovery as tort damages, but California has allowed the recovery of eco-
nomic losses in situations in which the losses are directly foreseeable.3 2
SLAPP-back compensatory damages may include damage to the original
SLAPP defendant's reputation.313
2. Emotional distress damages
Although SLAPPs certainly cause mental anguish,31 4 it is not clear
whether damages for emotional distress are recoverable. California case
law does not require any physical manifestation or symptoms of emo-
tional distress for recovery of emotional distress damages.315 Malicious
prosecution and abuse of process claims, however, do not seem to include
mental anguish damage components, and SLAPP-back plaintiffs may not
recover for violation of their constitutional rights in the abstract, without
showing any actual damages.3 6
309. See ia at 818-19, 693 P.2d at 799-800, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15. Note that Brandt
extends the allowance of fees under Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618,
620-21, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1963), because the Brandt theory applies to
two-party suits while the court in Prentice prohibited the allowance of attorney's fees against a
defendant in a two-party lawsuit. a
310. For example, in Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. FO11230, slip op. at 10-11 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 14, 1991), if the defendant farmers had lost, they would have been forced to sell
their farms, "thereby betraying the family's memory and future." Costantini & Nash, supra
note 4, at 465.
311. See, e.g., Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 467-68; supra note 121 and accompany-
ing text.
312. See, eg., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804-06, 598 P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 410 (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 153, § 110, at 766-70.
313. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (citing Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). If the SLAPP-back is for defamation, damage
to reputation may be presumed if it is not a matter of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that
states may award presumed or punitive damages for defamation that does not include "matters
of public concern" even without actual malice).
314. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chilling effects on
SLAPP defendants.
315. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-30, 616 P.2d 813, 819-21, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-39 (1980).
316. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307-10 (holding that student could only recover compensa-
tory damages for denial of sufficient suspension procedures if student proved actual injury).
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In the alternative, a SLAPP-back plaintiff could initially sue on a
theory of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ex-
pressly allowing damages~for emotional distress is a possible component
of an anti-SLAPP statutory scheme.
3. Restitutionary recovery
Victor Cosentino proposes an inverted restitutionary recovery
model. 17 His plan is "inverted" in that the plaintiff will pay, and it is
"restitutionary" in that it focuses on the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment,
rather than on the victim's loss-as in tort-or on the victim's expected
gain-as in contract.31 8 Cosentino's plan is based on the premise that the
specter of paying the defendant's fees and costs will not deter most
SLAPP plaintiffs, whereas significant restitutionary awards will.319 For
example, if the plaintiff developer is protecting a project worth $1 million
to the plaintiff, by SLAPPing the defendant citizen group, the SLAPP
will no doubt be cost-effective to the plaintiff if the plaintiff eventually
need only pay out $25,000 in fees. However, if a plaintiff developer stood
to lose the entire $1 million profit by losing the SLAPP, then presumably
the plaintiff would never risk the SLAPP.
Cosentino's theory is based on true deterrence: Plaintiffs will never
bring a SLAPP if they have nothing to gain. His model arrives at the
starting figure for the restitutionary award by using the damage amount
claimed by plaintiff in the SLAPP. 320 For example, if the plaintiff devel-
oper SLAPPs the defendant citizen group for $1 million in profits alleg-
edly lost as a result of defendant's defamation, the model uses the $1
million figure to measure the restitutionary recovery. The model also
leaves room for adjustment of this figure "based on the plaintiff's ability
to pay."g321 This restitutionary model accurately reflects the insufficiency
of costs and fee awards for truly deterring SLAPPs.
Unfortunately, the drawbacks of this proposed restitutionary
scheme exceed its advantages. First, the plaintiff's gain in filing the
SLAPP would not be directly at the defendant's expense. In reality, this
is a but-for causation issue in disguise: Would the defendant's opposition
to the plaintiff's project actually have prevented the entire project but-for
the SLAPP? Alternatively, without the SLAPP, would the defendant's
oppositional activity only have cut into the plaintiff's profit? Obviously,
317. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 417, 427.
318. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 153, § 94,'at 672-73.
319. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 415-18.
320. Id. at 410 n.70.
321. Id. He provides no further explanation of this qualification.
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practical difficulties of proof predominate these questions. Second and
most important, the plaintiff's profit on the project comes mostly from
the plaintiff's skill or investment and may be only tangentially related to
the SLAPP. Therefore, such a draconian damage measurement as
Cosentino recommends would excessively punish the plaintiff's wrongful
SLAPP. A SLAPP plaintiff may well deserve to be punished for the
damage traceable to the SLAPP, but it cannot be assumed that without
the SLAPP's effectiveness the project would not have gone through any-
way. The third drawback to this recovery scheme is the traditional con-
cern that the risk of losing the plaintiff's entire profit would chill not
only SLAPP plaintiffs but also plaintiffs with borderline tort claims that
they believe are legitimate.
4. Punitive damages
SLAPP-back plaintiffs can recover punitive damages if they can
show malicious intent.3 22 The SLAPP-back theories outlined above,
such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process, are all intentional
tort theories and so require wrongful intent as a prima facie element.3 23
In Wegis v. J. G. Boswell Co.,324 the plaintiff farmers were awarded $10
million in punitive damages for malicious prosecution, abuse of process
and tortious violation of constitutional rights.3 25 Judge Neely's dissent in
Webb v. Fury 26 recommends that if a SLAPP plaintiff loses at trial, the
SLAPP defendant should get more than that defendant's full costs "if...
it becomes apparent that the plaintiff actually was using the legal process
in the same despicable way that he had alleged the defendant had [been],
namely, to oppress citizens who have legitimately exercised first amend-
ment rights.,
3 27
The amount of punitive damages traditionally is within the jury's
discretion.328 Judge Neely suggested in his Webb dissent, however, that
"the court should exercise its equitable powers to impose costs against
322. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981);
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223
(1975). Grimshaw, the exploding Pinto case, makes clear that the malice needed for punitive
damages is not evil intent, but instead "conscious disregard of the probability" that an injury
to another will ensue from the actor's conduct. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381
(quoting Dawes v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322-23
(1980)).
323. See supra part V.
324. No. F011230, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991).
325. Id. at 2; Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426, 428.
326. 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (W.Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting).
327. Id (Neely, J., dissenting).
328. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042 (1991).
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the plaintiff in excess of [the defendant's] actual loss from defending the
case, in essence fining those who file frivolous cases. ' 3 29 Because the cru-
cial First Amendment rights of free speech and petition are involved in
the original SLAPP, jury determination of punitive amounts would seem
more consistent with the policies underlying the Beacon Theaters, Inc. v.
Westover 33 0 line of cases. In reviewing punitive damage amounts, the
jury can consider a SLAPP plaintiff's wealth and degree of culpability
and the possible deterrent effect of punitive damages on other similarly
situated plaintiffs.331
5. Statutory combinations of damage measures
Anti-SLAPP statutory schemes can of course call for any combina-
tion of these damage remedies. At a minimum, most statutes or bills
allow a court to award litigation costs and attorney's fees.332 On the
other end of the spectrum, Cosentino's proposed restitutionary damage
measure would award SLAPP defendants damages in the amount of the
plaintiff's anticipated profits.333 SLAPP defendants may be able to re-
cover compensatory damages and punitive damages in SLAPP-backs,
but as discussed, by the time a SLAPP-back is won, the original SLAPP
has long since accomplished its desired purposes of delay, expense and
distraction.334
More immediate, statutorily imposed damage schemes would more
effectively deter SLAPPs. The larger the amounts prescribed by statute,
the more they will deter SLAPPs and support First Amendment rights.
The smaller the prescribed amounts, the more they will bolster a plain-
tiff's rights of access to the judicial system and the less they will intrude
on a plaintiff's otherwise legitimate profits. The middle ground would be
to statutorily allow SLAPP defendants to recover their actual damages
329. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 525 (citing Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (W.Va. 1981)
(Neely, J., dissenting)).
330. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
331. The United States Supreme Court in Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044, and the California
Court of Appeal in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981), held that the following factors should be weighed when assessing the jury's award:
(1) the reprehensibility of the SLAPP plaintiff's conduct; (2) the wealth of the defendant;
(3) the amount of the compensatory damages; (4) the amount that would actually serve as a
deterrent to the defendant and others; (5) the relation between the amount of the compensa-
tory damages, any statutory penalties and the amount of punitive damages; (6) the effects on
third parties; (7) the harm to defendants; and (8) all the costs of the litigation. See Haslip,
111 S. Ct. at 1044-45; Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
332. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.510-.520; Act of Sept. 16, 1992; S. 51, supra
note 106; A. 190, supra note 106; A. 10721, supra note 302.
333. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 410 n.70, 417, 427.
334. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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proximately caused by the SLAPP-once it was identified as a SLAPP-
including their damages for emotional distress, Which is a major reper-
cussion of a SLAPP. In addition, it is imperative that a statutory dam-
age scheme provide for both the plaintiff and the defendant. The
defendant should recover actual damages from the SLAPP and the plain-
tiff should in turn recover rightful damages if the suit is determined not
to be a SLAPP and successfully litigated.
B. Attorney's Fees
1. The American rule
California and federal courts follow the American rule that each
party in a lawsuit must pay its own attorney's fees.335 The policies be-
hind the American rule are to protect poor plaintiffs from the burden of
paying their opponents' fees; to encourage parties to use the judicial sys-
tem; and to relieve the court system from the administrative duty of com-
puting costs and fees.33 6 The rationale for the English rule,337 in contrast
with the American rule, is to discourage meritless actions such as
SLAPPs. Under the English rule, in any case in which fees are awarded,
the fees go only to the prevailing party.338
2. Statutory fee awards
A provision for awarding costs and fees to SLAPP defendants is a
necessary component of any anti-SLAPP statutory scheme, although the
prospect of adverse fee awards may not by itself be enough to deter
SLAPP plaintiffs. As discussed, one of a SLAPP's prime chilling factors
on SLAPP defendants is expense.339 A fee-awarding provision is the
lowest common denominator of the anti-SLAPP statutes and bills sur-
veyed for this Article .3 ° All the existing common-law and statutory
exceptions to the American rule award fees after trial, as discussed in
335. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1992); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1974); Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar.
Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 620, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1963).
336. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
337. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 (1983).
338. See, e.g., Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1052 (Mith Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 1064 (1990). To prevail, a party must somehow alter the legal
relationship between it and the other party: It need not win on all issues, but merely must win
on one significant issue. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 783 (1989) (holding that teachers' victory on significant First Amendment issues,
although other parts of litigation continued, was sufficient for teachers to receive fees under
private-attorney-general theory).
339. See supra part II.C.
340. See supra note 332 for a list of bills and statutes.
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detail below.341 Very early resolution is the crucial element that a
SLAPP-specific statute awarding costs and fees could add to existing
exceptions.342
3. Common-law exceptions
Three existing common-law exceptions to the American rule are
particularly applicable in the SLAPP context. First, "when the losing
party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons,'" the prevailing party is entitled to a fee award under the "in-
herent power in the courts. 3 43 This exception is particularly applicable
to SLAPPs. In addition, California state courts have adopted two excep-
tions rejected by the federal courts: (1) fee awards for private attorneys
general;3" and (2) fee awards if those fees are essentially tort dam-
ages.345 Because the SLAPP dynamic reverses the roles, the defendant,
however, would be the recipient under these various theories.346
4. Statutory exceptions
Statutory exceptions to the American rule also are permitted.
347
The statutory authority for the fee award must be express; the judiciary
does not have the power to create new exceptions sua sponte. 348 These
provisions can be SLAPP-specific, as found in the recently enacted
Lockyer bill,349 or SLAPP parties can rely on existing fee statutes such as
341. See infra notes 354-72 and accompanying text.
342. See supra part III.C.
343. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quoting
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). For a
listing of the common-law exceptions, see id at 257-60.
344. See, eg., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 925, 593
P.2d 200, 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1979); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 47, 569 P.2d
1303, 1315, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327 (1977). But seeAlyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263 (rejecting
"'private attorney general"' exception to American rule).
345. See Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 819-20, 693 P.2d 796, 800-01, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 215-16 (1985); California Fair Plan Ass'n v. Politi, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1617,
270 Cal. Rptr. 243,246 (1990); Sooy v. Peter, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1305, 1310, 270 Cal. Rptr. 151,
154 (1990). See supra part VI.A for a discussion of the Brandt exception. Note that common-
law and statutory exceptions are traditionally used to award fees to plaintiffs.
346. See County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 869, 223
Cal. Rptr. 846, 858 (1986).
347. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1992) (measuring attorney fees
by agreement, except if specifically provided by statute); Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enters., 111
Cal. App. 3d 215, 222, 168 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528 (1980); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 601
P.2d 963, 967 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980).
348. See, ag., CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 1021; Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263, 269.
349. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2.
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California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5.350 The primary ad-
vantage of a SLAPP-specific fee award is immediate review, before
trial.
351
Section 1021.5 represents the codification of the private-attorney-
general fee recovery exception.352 Usually, the statute awards fees to the
plaintiff. In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,353 however,
fees were awarded to the defendants because the defendants' self-interest
was outweighed by an important public interest.354 More specifically, the
statute allows the court to award fees if:
(1) [there is] an important right affecting the public interest:
(a) a significant benefit... has been conferred on the general
public... (b) the necessity and financial burden of private en-
forcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of
the recovery.355
In determining whether the party claiming attorney's fees (the PCAF)
should be awarded the fees, courts must consider the PCAF's advance-
ment of "the public's, rather than [the party's] own private interest. "
356
The PCAF's interest in the suit must "transcend personal self-inter-
ests."' 357 Courts have read section 1021.5(1)(c) as requiring the PCAF to
show that the cost of the suit, including fees, to the PCAF was "'out of
proportion to [the PCAF's] individual stake in the matter' ,,;358 so if the
PCAF's cost was less than the amount at issue in the case, the PCAF
should not recover fees.359
Section 1021.5 is complex and so qualified by case law that it will
not provide an adequate vehicle through which SLAPP defendants may
recover attorney's fees.3" In addition, as discussed in part II.A, the
public-interest element in section 1021.5 narrows the statute's applicabil-
350. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
351. See Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2.
352. Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 624 n.1, 652 P.2d 985, 985 n.1, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754,
754 n.1 (1982).
353. 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986).
354. d at 858, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 850; see Brecher, supra note 29, at 134.
355. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
356. Brecher, supra note 29, at 140.
357. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 869, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
358. Brecher, supra note 29, at 133 (quoting County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 89, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1978)).
359. Id at 134. Brecher notes that in Schwartz v. City of Rosemead, 155 Cal. App. 3d 547,
560, 202 Cal. Rptr. 400, 409 (1984), the PCAF wanted $22,000 in fees, but the PCAF would
have lost $100,000 if the development had gone through, so the court awarded no fees. Id.
360. Brecher, supra note 29, at 136; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 416.
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ity, thereby excluding many SLAPPs.3 6 1 Many SLAPP defendants are
self-interested, but their constitutional petitioning rights should still be
protected.
In sum, any statutory fee provision should, within the narrow
SLAPP context, broadly permit fee awards. Statutes should at a mini-
mum provide fee awards to SLAPP defendants. In order to realistically
deter SLAPPs, statutory schemes also should provide for awards of com-
pensatory or even punitive damages.
VII. STATUTORY REMEDIES
Recently, a compromise anti-SLAPP statute, the Lockyer bill, be-
came law in California. 36 2 Although the political fortunes of the Lockyer
bill or of the proposed anti-SLAPP statutes in other states are beyond the
scope of this Article, both their political popularity and their opposition
should be mentioned. The California legislature has overwhelmingly
passed all of the anti-SLAPP bills.363 The major California printed press
have consistently endorsed the anti-SLAPP bill.364 Predictably, Califor-
nia development interests have been wary of the anti-SLAPP bill.365
Governors Deukmejian and Wilson vetoed previous versions of the
Lockyer bill, on the grounds that existing protections against SLAPPs
were sufficient.366
Existing protections, however, do not in practice deter SLAPPs.
Because SLAPPs are not brought to win, remedies that prevent frivolous
361. See supra part II.A; Sive, supra note 29; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 421.
362. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 (to be codified at CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 425.16).
363. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 425 n.164, notes that California Senate Bill 341 (predeces-
sor to the current statute) passed 33-5 in the Senate and 77-0 in the Assembly.
364. See, eg., Five Bills the Governor Should Sign, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1991, at B6; Putting
a Stop to Unfair Suits, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1991, at A16; Slap Down the SLAPP Suits; Their
Real Intent Is to Shut the Little Guy Up, Putting a Big Chill on Debate, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, Oct. 6, 1991, at C6.
365. Sive, supra note 29, notes that unfair delays could cause development projects heavy
costs; but, in fact, the anti-SLAPP expediting provisions of the Lockyer bill would assist both
defendants and plaintiffs in this respect. Hager, supra note 18, quotes Richard J. Lyon, a
lobbyist for the California Building Industry Association, as saying that SLAPPs are" 'a very
glamorous media issue,... David versus Goliath ... but the problem that exists out there is
comparatively very small, given the total development of our state.'" Id. at 31.
The other main opponent of the Lockyer bill was the California Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion (CTLA). But CTLA opposed the corporate tax reform that was tacked onto the anti-
SLAPP bill, not the anti-SLAPP bill.
366. Hager, supra note 18; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6; Walters,
supra note 18. Governor Wilson wrote: "I am concerned that the pleading hurdles, specifi-
cally, the evidence test, provided in this bill are higher than for deterrents for other malicious
lawsuits, for example, volunteer directors [sic] immunity." Letter from Governor Wilson to
the California Senate (Oct. 14, 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los.Angeles Law Review).
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claims from winning, such as SLAPP-back damages, will not discourage
SLAPPs.36 7 Delay is a prime goal of SLAPP plaintiffs, and existing rem-
edies are usually slow, ranging from summary judgment after discovery,
to SLAPP-backs after trial.368 Only accelerating judicial review of a po-
tential SLAPP's merits will provide a real disincentive. Furthermore,
existing remedies do not prevent the chilling effect of SLAPPs on the
exercise of constitutional speech and petitioning rights, which are vital to
preserving participatory democracy.
369
Finally, a statutory approach is more appropriate than a decisional
or rule-of-court approach because SLAPP disputes are quintessentially
political.370 As discussed, SLAPP plaintiffs intend to remove the dispute
from the political and public arenas to the courtroom. There they can
better control the balance of power. And a protracted, arcane litigation
process may help remove the dispute from the public eye. 71
Opponents of SLAPP-specific statutory remedies are especially con-
cerned about inhibiting plaintiffs' constitutional rights of access to the
legal system. But SLAPPs are by definition frivolous suits over which
such a constitutional protection would not extend.372 Thus, to protect
plaintiffs' rights of access to the courts, anti-SLAPP statutes must care-
fully identify SLAPPs. 373 Existing remedies such as malicious prosecu-
367. See supra part II.C, for a more detailed discussion of SLAPP plaintiffs' motivations for
bringing SLAPPs.
368. See supra parts ILI.B, IV, V.
369. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967);
Cosentino, supra note 16, at 406-08.
370. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981) (characterizing underlying dispute as
"a vigorous exchange of ideas which is more properly within the political arena"). See Cosen-
tino, supra note 16, at 428, and supra part I.C for a discussion of SLAPPs' depoliticization of
the issues involved.
Some, such as politicians not wishing to incur the political disfavor of business interests,
may prefer that this delicate issue be relegated to the courts. Although courts traditionally
avoid political questions, SLAPPs do involve the frivolous use of the judicial system, and
courts have not been reluctant to use their power to dismiss SLAPPs. See, eg., Sierra Club v.
Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Webb, 282 S.E.2d 28. Under the Supreme Court's
analysis of political questions in Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), courts have apparently
had no difficulty finding judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
issues presented by SLAPPs. With First Amendment rights being the most salient legal issues
involved, there is certainly no "textually demonstrable commitment" of exclusive power by the
Constitution to one of the political branches. Judicial involvement would not be disrespectful
of the legislature's territory, or an embarrassing usurpation of its power. See Baker, 369 U.S.
at 217. Hence, the arguments for keeping regulation of SLAPPs in the political branches are
policy arguments as opposed to strictly legal ones.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
372. See supra notes 212-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Noerr/Pen-
nington sham exception.
373. See supra part II for a discussion of identification issues.
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tion "often require defendants to go to trial and spend substantial
amounts of money and time in order to prevail. Rather than incur the
expense and the trauma, many citizens withdraw. Others, scared off by
the threat of lawsuits, never enter the fray at all. 
374
The single, most pivotal benefit that statutory solutions to the
SLAPP problem offer is a very early resolution of the claim. 375 To do
this, legislation must specify criteria by which to identify potential
SLAPPs. Anti-SLAPP statutes and bills commonly single out suits that
involve and possibly threaten a defendant's First Amendment rights of
free speech and petitioning for redress. 376 The public-interest-related ele-
ment is the second most frequent threshold identification factor in anti-
SLA-PP legislation.377 As discussed, limiting the scope of an anti-SLAPP
provision to public-interest-related litigation can provide too wide a loop-
hole for SLAPP plaintiffs, because SLAPP defendants petitioning the
government are almost always motivated by some self-interest. 37 New
Jersey's Russo bill creates two classes of SLAPP defendants: (1) those
who communicate to a public entity about anything "reasonably of con-
cern" to that entity; and (2) those who express opinions "concerning a
public issue which affects" them.37 9 Only with the second class does the
bill specify a public issue, although issues in the first class must concern a
public entity. Because California's recently enacted Lockyer bill already
exempts any publicly prosecuted litigation,38 0 it should eliminate the pre-
requisite that the potential SLAPP must be "in connection with a public
issue" to be covered.38 l
374. Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6.
375. See supra part II.C for a discussion of expedition of initial judicial review. For exam-
ple, a provision of the recently enacted Lockyer bill allows the court to review a potential
SLAPP on its merits soon after filing, before discovery. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codi-
fied at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)). At that time, the court examines the pleadings
and supporting affidavits from both sides to determine whether "there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Id.
376. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1992); Act of Sept. 16,
1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)) (specifying the "right of peti-
tion or free speech under the United States or California Constitution"); S. 51, supra note 106;
A. 190, supra note 106. The California, New Jersey and Washington statutes each have pol-
icy-statement preambles that decry the chill of SLAPPs on public participation.
377. See supra part II.A for further discussion of the public-interest element.
378. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d
28, 40-41 (W. Va. 1981); Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401.
379. A. 190, supra note 106.
380. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2. California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(d) will provide
that "any enforcement action brought in the name of [Californians] by the Attorney General,
district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor" will not be covered by the
anti-SLAPP statute. Id
381. Id (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
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What an anti-SLAPP statute should really address is not whether
the defendant's petitioning concerns a public issue, but whether it is in
good faith. The Washington statute covers only "a person who in good
faith communicates a complaint or information to any" government
body.38 2 The New Jersey bill contains identical language and adds that a
defendant must also be without actual malice.38 3 Analogously, the
Maryland bill also requires good faith on the defendant's part.38 4
Although the Noerr/Pennington doctrine already protects against bad-
faith or sham petitioning,3 85 California's newly enacted statute could sen-
sibly add this qualification of threshold petitioning activity.
VIII. COMBINING REMEDIES TO CREATE THE BEST ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE FOR CALIFORNIA
The Lockyer bill contains three crucial features.386 First, the anti-
SLAPP protection is triggered by involvement of the defendant's First
Amendment rights of speech and petitioning, under either the Federal or
California Constitution. Most crucial, the bill provides for judicial re-
view at a very early stage. Once the pleadings are filed and the suit is
identified as a potential SLAPP, involving First Amendment rights, both
sides can submit affidavits. The court will then evaluate the merits of the
case using the "probability" test.387 Finally, a SLAPP defendant may
recover any litigation costs and attorney's fees, upon dismissal, from the
plaintiff.
The Lockyer bill further provides that if a SLAPP defendant mo-
tions to strike frivolously or "solely... to cause unnecessary delay," then
the plaintiff may recover costs and fees. The court uses a section 128.5
standard for this determination.388 Discovery also is suspended until the
court decides on the special anti-SLAPP motion to strike.389
Several possible additions and modifications to the California statute
arise from the foregoing discussions of common-law and statutory solu-
tions to the SLAPP problem.
382. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.510 (West Supp. 1992).
383. A. 190, supra note 106.
384. S. 51, supra note 106.
385. See supra part IV.E for a discussion of the Noerr/Pennington sham exception.
386. Act of Sept. 16, 1992. See generally Lawmaker Renews Push Against "Strategic" Suits,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at B2 (announcing renewed effort to enact anti-SLAPP
legislation).
387. See supra part III.C for a discussion of the "probability" test.
388. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)). See
supra part IV.B.3 for a discussion of California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5.
389. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g)). See
supra part III.B for a discussion of the discovery issues.
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1. ELIMINATE ANY THRESHOLD PUBLIC-INTEREST-RELATED ELE-
MENT. As 'far as the threshold identification of a SLAPP, which
would trigger the bill's coverage, the public-interest element
390
should be eliminated in order to avoid excluding self-interested but
legitimate petitioning activity by a SLAPP defendant.
2. REQUIRE SPECIFIC PLEADING. To facilitate the initial judicial re-
view, where constitutional speech or petitioning rights are involved,
the statute should mandate specific pleading.
391
3. USE A SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY TEST. Rephrase "probability" as
"substantial possibility." The handful of SLAPPs dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) 392 would have failed a substantial possibility screen-
usually because they lacked a prima facie element-let alone a
probability test. This alteration would not significantly dilute the
statute, but would be politically expedient.393
4. AWARD REAL DAMAGES TO DEFENDANTS. Most critical for
SLAPP defendants, the legislation should award actual, out-of-
pocket, tort damages to SLAPP defendants, rather than just costs
and fees.39a A defendant's damage measurements should allow for
emotional distress recovery-an inevitable consequence of a
SLAPP-but not for punitive damages. Punitive damages should be
available if the defendant is willing to subsequently pursue a SLAPP-
back3 95 at the defendant's own expense.
5. AwARD DAMAGES TO A PREVAILING PLAINTIFF. This and the next
suggested addition to the current statute are important for preserv-
ing fairness for SLAPP plaintiffs. The statute should award a plain-
tiff reasonable damages if the plaintiff prevails. 396 Currently,
plaintiffs may recover costs and fees "if the court finds that [the de-
fendant's] special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay." 397 This may not be enough.
6. DEFENDANT MUST PETITION IN GOOD FAITH TO BE PROTECTED.
The statute should protect a defendant's constitutional petitioning
390. See supra part II.A. California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b) will cover only
First Amendment activity "in connection with a public issue." Act of Sept. 16, 1992.
391. See supra part III.A.
392. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see, ag., supra text accompanying note 91.
393. See supra text accompanying note 98.
394. See supra part VI.A. Defendant's damages should serve to make defendant whole,
rather than to relieve the SLAPP plaintiff of any unjust enrichment. See supra discussion
following note 331.
395. See supra note 322-31 and accompanying text.
396. See supra text accompanying note 306.
397. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)).
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activity only if that activity is in good faith and not merely to harass
or to improperly obtain an advantage over the plaintiff.3 98
7. ALLOW STATE INTERVENTION ON THE DEFENDANT'S BEHALF.
3 9 9
The intervention could be permissive-at the government agency's
discretion-or mandatory, where the agency would statutorily be a
necessary party to the litigation.
8. PROVIDE UP-FRONT PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY COSTS.
If a potential SLAPP survives the initial early review, yet the court
still recognizes its potential as a SLAPP, then the court should order
the plaintiff to advance the defendant's discovery costs if and only if
the defendant can demonstrate its inability and plaintiff's ability to
pay these costs.' The statute allows suspension of discovery while
the court is deciding the motion to strike, but this may not eliminate
the intimidation and expense factors associated with burdensome
discovery in a SLAPP.
9. GUARANTEE EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE. Finally, an anti-
SLAPP statute cannot permit a SLAPP defendant's existing insur-
ance coverage to dry up as a result of filing the SLAPP.4 ° 1 This
could be accomplished by mandating continued coverage, unless
other unrelated underwriting factors have changed. If the lawsuit is
a SLAPP, the requirement to maintain coverage cannot harm the
insurance carrier because the insured defendant will inevitably pre-
vail, thus incurring no insurable losses. Another possible method of
ensuring continued coverage would be through a state insurance
fund, possibly funded by fees charged to unsuccessful SLAPP
plaintiffs.
IX. CONCLUSION
SLAPPs are difficult to deter because their plaintiffs are not moti-
vated by winning the claim. Instead, SLAPP plaintiffs wish to tie up the
defendants as long as possible and to drain them of their financial, polit-
ical and sometimes personal resources in the process. Existing remedies,
from sanctions for frivolous lawsuits to SLAPP-back theories such as
malicious prosecution, are not designed for such a situation in which the
plaintiff has no expectation of winning, but sues merely to take up the
defendant's time and money. Supplemental statutory remedies are essen-
398. See supra part IV.E for a discussion of the NoerrlPennington sham exception.
399. See supra part III.E.
400. See supra part III.B.
401. See supra part IV.A; text accompanying note 121.
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tial to provide for judicial review at an early enough stage in a SLAPP to
render it useless.
An anti-SLAPP statute must include several provisions that protect
a plaintiff's right of access to the courts. SLAPPs must be defined nar-
rowly, focusing on suits challenging a defendant's constitutional right of
free speech and petition. A prevailing plaintiff should be guaranteed the
same compensatory damages or costs and fee awards as defendants may
now recover under various statutes and bills. The threshold review
should only screen out those suits that lack any substantial possibility of
success on their merits. Finally, the Noerr/Pennington sham exception
to the right to petition should be codified in the anti-SLAPP statute,
which should cover only good faith petitioning.
Along with the other minor recommendations outlined above-spe-
cific pleading, state intervention, discovery costs in advance and state-
guaranteed continuation of insurance coverage-this statutory blueprint
strikes a fair balance between a plaintiff's right of access to the courts
and a defendant's rights of free speech and petitioning. The point here
must not be to stop developers or polluters but to allow the political pro-
cess to evaluate their projects that impact their neighbors and their com-
munities. A statute including all the preceding provisions should
effectively deter SLAPPs, a mission for which existing judicial remedies
are inadequate.
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